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This dissertation examines evidence on the effectiveness of voluntary certification 
programs in the built environment. Drawing on unique data from buildings certified under 
the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) label, the technologies 
adopted toward certification are examined. Analysis reveals strengths and weaknesses of 
the program design, including apparent promotion of energy and water efficiency, but 
limited promotion of public good provision. These findings motivate extensive theoretical 
development around the valuation of environmental products: traditional economic 
signaling perspectives are argued to be of little value in understanding “noisy” signals of 
environmental quality. Drawing on perspectives from organizational theory and strategic 
management, a framework for noisy signals is developed, and applied to three empirical 
questions. First, the extent to which noisy signals are strategically adopted is examined by 
assessing patterns in technology adoption toward green building certification. Second, the 
evolving distribution of LEED scores is assessed against a dynamic imputed counterfactual 
to reveal the extent to which the certification fosters a “Race to the Top.” Here, signaling 
and learning are posited as a mechanism for such a “Race,” in a critique of past theory. 
Finally, the shift in practices contributing from public goods to private gains is evaluated 
over time, calling to question how we should measure the success of environmental 
programs which aim to promote improvements with regard to myriad concerns. In sum, 
this work contributes to our understanding of corporate sustainability, certification 




CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This introduction presents an overview of green building economics through a survey of 
the theoretical and empirical evidence concerning green buildings. Over the past decade, 
green building is increasingly the focus of attention among environmental economists and 
policymakers. There is no single definition of “green buildings” or its related policy. 
However, researchers and organizations tend to discuss green buildings in terms of impacts 
on human health, the environment, and resource use. A growing number of building 
policies in the United States and in other countries aim to mitigate these impacts. 
Green building policies include voluntary programs and mandatory regulations, and 
vary to address concerns related to the entire life of the building, from design and 
construction to operation and deconstruction. These include component-level policies to 
promote energy efficiency, such as appliance standards, building codes, and other 
technology-specific regulations. Other policies are more general, addressing concerns 
indirectly related to the built environment: wetlands offset policies, antisprawl policies, 
and others fall in this arena. Throughout this dissertation, I focus on whole-building 
investments, rather than programs targeting only a single building characteristic (such as 
energy-efficiency). This preserves the importance of the myriad types of environmental 
impacts that can be addressed in the built environment.  
In the next section I provide additional background concerning the green building 
movement. To emphasize the justifications for policy intervention in the built environment, 
I then review market failures and barriers that have given rise to green building programs. 
I discuss empirical evidence on the impacts of green building policies to demonstrate the 
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viability of green building programs as a market solution, based on signaling theory. Then, 
I reflect on a key challenge that comes with the complexity of this policy approach: because 
of the immense flexibility of the green certification studied, certification pathways are not 
homogenous, creating noisy signals of building quality which would seem to undermine 
the policy’s fundamental mechanism. To resolve this issue, and to advance a theory of 
noisy signals, I turn to literature on organizations and management. This provides the 
essential background necessary to engage more deeply throughout the dissertation, as I 
note in an overview of each chapter. 
 
1.1 The Green Building Movement 
The green building movement is a network of governmental, nongovernmental, and private 
actors seeking to address the environmental and human health impact of the entire life of a 
building, from construction to deconstruction. Green building techniques and practices 
have become increasingly popular even absent regulation. Voluntary building certification 
programs reduce the costs of acquiring information about a building and, by using a third-
party certifier, credibly verify the environmental performance of a building. There are two 
related economic rationales for green building and related policies: to encourage firms to 
internalize externalities (Kingsley 2008) and to encourage the private provision of a public 
good (Kotchen 2006). A key strategy of voluntary building certification programs like the 
United States Green Building Council’s (USGBC) Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design (LEED) is to tie a set of private benefits to public good production 
by program participants. That is, by building green, a developer averts environmental 
damage; by certifying green and joining the “club,” a building owner signals quality to 
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stakeholders (such as tenants and customers) to obtain a premium for his product (Potoski 
and Prakash 2009). Organizations may be able to capture economic value by certifying 
hard-to-observe process improvements.  
Rather than stipulating specific standards or technologies, green building 
certification programs allow for the adoption of customized solutions for individual 
buildings. This flexibility is a critical characteristic that will premise much of the analysis 
contained in the dissertation. Certification programs like LEED incentivize an array of 
improved building technologies and construction practices, including those that improve 
outcomes in terms of energy, atmosphere, water use, water quality, materials use, as well 
as other categories. Owners certify a property by fulfilling criteria across a sufficient range 
of environmental outcomes, achieving one of the tiered certifications that signal an 
improved building quality. However, certification programs rarely disclose specific 
building improvements. This flexibility means that the evaluative criteria for green 
building spans multiple categories of environmental and human health impacts. This has 
hindered assessment of program effectiveness, and obfuscates common understanding of 
the certification. 
 
1.2 Market Motivations and Market Failures in Green Buildings 
Greener buildings perform better and can provide marketing benefits, though market 
failures inhibit adoption of many sustainable practices. The popularity of green building 
programs appears market motivated, rather than government-mandated: these policies and 
programs address market failures, such as asymmetric information and negative 
externalities.  
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Numerous performance advantages of green buildings arise from sustainable, 
efficient building operations. Kats (2003), Singh et al. (2010), and Turban and Greening 
(1996) are among those showing that enhanced building performance can come from 
energy efficiency, water efficiency, higher-quality outputs, and improved employee 
productivity (by helping to recruit and retain higher quality employees). Operational cost 
reductions and improved productivity enhance a property’s value in resale or rental 
markets, and a variety of studies note how green buildings appear more resilient to climate, 
weather, regulatory, market shocks (Matisoff, Noonan, and Flowers 2016).  
As a marketing opportunity, green certification operates as a signal to a variety of 
stakeholders. Green marketing may benefit green building owners by allowing the owner 
to derive economic value from the producing of positive externalities that appeal to 
environmentally-minded stakeholders. Green certification may improve firm reputation, 
and increase demand for products, such that the firm may capture market rents and 
premiums. Because certification requires above-code practices, adoption may also curry 
favor with regulators (Coglianese 2001). For example, Deng, Li, and Quigley (2012) show 
that certification to Singapore’s Green Mark standard paid off following the strengthening 
of environmental regulations.  
Despite demonstrated benefits of building green, market failures cause systematic 
under-production of sustainable buildings. These market failures include information 
asymmetries and externalities. By addressing these, the green building movement is an 
effort to better align the private costs of an industry with their social costs (Kotchen 2006, 
Potoski and Prakash 2009). A building label or certification signals stakeholders by 
verifying unobservable qualities related to mitigation of externalities. 
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1.2.1 Externalities 
The built environment generates significant pollution, as the building life cycle has 
many unpriced externalities related to building construction, operation, and deconstruction. 
For example, waste from the construction process impacts air and water quality. Building 
operation produces unpriced air and water quality programs, social burdens related to 
energy use. Passively, a built structure also impacts water quality through storm water 
runoff. Site selection and site remediation affect urban development patterns and thus, 
indirectly, congestion, air quality, and other urban problems.  
The green building movement seeks to reduce negative externalities in the building 
life cycle. Participants in voluntary green building programs such as LEED undertake 
costly private actions to produce public goods (by, for example, using sustainably sourced 
building construction materials). Yet owners face little incentive to mitigate externalities 
without some type of market intervention. To encourage participation, the stakeholders in 
the green building movement must also address information asymmetries. 
1.2.2 Information asymmetries  
There are often information asymmetries associated with green buildings, leading 
to the under-provision of difficult-to-observe building attributes. Builders have a better 
understanding of the construction process than building owners, and building owners or 
occupants have a better understanding of its design and performance features than potential 
buyers or tenants. For example, efficiency and indoor air quality are difficult to detect and 
verify prior to purchase or lease. This makes buildings akin to an experiential good, 
whereby the quality of the product cannot be observed until after consumption. This means 
that building owners may not have good information about the future value or operating 
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costs of a greener building (Patel and Chugan 2013). Furthermore, some green qualities, 
such as sustainable material sourcing, construction waste diversion, are impossible to 
observe even after occupation. In this sense, green buildings are credence goods. 
Difficulties detecting information about building quality can lead to a “market for 
lemons” in green building construction (Akerlof 1970), whereby low-quality (traditional) 
buildings crowd out the high-quality (green) buildings. This deters investment in green 
buildings. Certification signals such difficult-to-observe improvements to building 
performance (Mason 2012) and its overall footprint, which might include energy 
efficiency, indoor air quality, or construction processes. Once certified, builders can easily 
relate quality information to key stakeholders who prefer green qualities. These may 
include building buyers, tenants, and employees (Singh et al. 2010) as well as the owning 
firm’s customers and investors (Chegut, Eichholtz, and Kok 2011, Kahn, Kok, and Quigley 
2013). Certification programs like LEED enable those who make the investments in green 
buildings to enjoy market premiums and recoup their expenses, through higher rental or 
sale prices for the property, or possibly lower wages for employees, greater availability of 
financial capital, higher prices for outputs, etc.  
Signaling is effective when it reliable distinguishes green buildings from traditional 
ones. That is, to induce an equilibrium that confers premiums only to higher quality 
buildings, a certified product must be of demonstrably higher value to consumers. And, the 
information signaled must be understood with lower costs compared to obtaining full 
information. For specific building qualities (e.g., installation of certain technologies, use 
of renewable fuels), certification schemes can verify these improvements and distinguish 
high-quality from low-quality buildings. For the many qualities that might be signaled by 
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green building certification (e.g., quality of management, firm’s environmental 
commitment), less able or less committed owners will find it more costly to successfully 
adopt a certifiable green building (Mason 2012).   
 
1.3 Evidence on the Economics of Green Buildings 
As a signaling tool, empirical evidence suggests that green building certification is 
effective in establishing a separating equilibrium between high and low quality buildings. 
Several studies demonstrate financial benefits for building green. For example, Eichholtz, 
Kok, and Yonder (2012) find that real estate investment trusts (REITs) that have a larger 
percentage of LEED certified properties in the portfolio have a higher value and lower 
price volatility than REITs with a lower percentage of LEED certified properties. Chegut, 
Eichholtz, and Kok (2014) show that buildings in the United Kingdom that are certified 
according to the BRE Environmental Assessment Method rent for longer contracts and at 
a 28 percent rental premium. They also find that green certification provides a higher 
premium for rental properties than for properties that are for sale, highlighting the role of 
certification in reducing information asymmetries and providing a low-cost way for 
prospective tenants to judge the overall quality of a property.   
 
1.4 Are Green Buildings Actually Greener? 
Because green building certification allows for flexibility and does not entail specific 
technological requirements, and because each type of green building or energy efficiency 
label is unique, some authors have referred to green certification as a “noisy” signal of 
building quality (Fuerst and McAllister 2011c, Kok, McGraw, and Quigley 2011, Jaffee, 
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Stanton, and Wallace 2012). Often the certification tier itself, rather than the building’s raw 
score or specific improvements, serves as a market signal. In fact, Fuerst and McAllister 
(2011b), Deng and Wu (2013), Reichardt (2014a), and Shewmake and Viscusi (2014) note 
significant premium effects at each tier.  
Historically, green building certifications have been far more about initial quality 
at the time of completion than about evaluating ongoing building performance. This adds 
to the noise in certifying performance. Recent LEED criteria and other municipal 
benchmarking efforts have attempted to address this disconnect between building design 
and performance by mandating energy efficiency requirements, requiring the use of energy 
monitoring, and using other behavioral nudges to encourage building users to optimize 
building performance (Palmer and Walls 2015). There is limited evidence suggesting that, 
on average, certified buildings cost less to operate than similar but uncertified buildings 
(Kats 2003). Energy efficiency would appear to be a promising area for operational cost 
savings and central to policy efforts aimed at promoting cost-effective green building 
upgrades (Chegut, Eichholtz, and Kok 2011).  
The ambiguity of certifications that distill the many dimensions of green buildings 
into a single numeric score or tiered levels raises questions about the value of these 
certifications to the market. The fact that consumers appear to value the building’s raw 
certification score over its tier (Kahn, Kok, and Quigley 2013) suggests there is a demand 
for information in the face of information asymmetries. Conversely, that LEED buildings 
tend to score just enough points to achieve the next certification tier suggests that the supply 
side of the market clearly recognizes the lumpy demand for environmental cachet and the 
symbolic value of green signals (Matisoff, Noonan, and Mazzolini 2014).  
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 Despite increasing awareness of green buildings, the success of green building 
policy tools is unclear. Because of the flexibility in certification schemes, adoption is not 
homogenous, and the resulting noisy signals present challenges to measuring outcomes. 
Signal noise can be exploited by low-quality firms to reestablish a pooling equilibrium in 
which premiums for green practices deteriorate (Akerlof 1970). Yet, such pooling is not 
evident from the persistent economic returns to green certification. Can flexible programs 
produce tailored adoption for finely-tuned signals, or simply signal noise? The answer to 
this question motivates much of the research presented in this dissertation.  
 If signals are noisy, they are understood as less effective in traditional economic 
thinking. Much of the literature on green building (as an information-based policy, or as a 
strategic management technique) recognizes the value of certifications as a market signal 
(King and Toffel 2009), and recognizes heterogeneity in the practice of building green 
(Matisoff, Noonan, and Flowers 2016), but fails to account for the apparent contradiction 
between the signaling mechanism and the noisy signal. But, if it is possible that green 
signals operate in more than a binary fashion, what has been treated as signal noise may 
rather be a finely-tuned signal. To reconsider this noise as tuning requires revisiting the 
literature construct a nuanced view of green signals.  
A broad body of literature has addressed voluntary programs, certifications, and 
green business extensively, but often treats all adopters homogenously. In doing so, large-
scale inquiries can be conducted to identify either the motivations for sustainable behavior, 
or outcomes of adopting sustainable practices. This approach fails to recognize the 
contradiction between the presumed signaling mechanism of homogenous adoption, and 
the known practice of tailored adaptation. Yet a body of literature on organizations 
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describes how and why practices evolve as they diffuse. To construct a framework for 
understanding signals as a multidimensional, finely-tuned mechanism, I draw on recent 
insights from organizations and management, integrating with established economic 
perspectives on signaling for a better understanding of signals, and signaling strategy. 
 
1.5 Adoption Versus Adaptation 
The observation that practices are not uniformly adopted is hardly new. Diffusion studies 
have long described the spread of new technologies through the population (Strang and 
Soule 1998). More recently, scholars have noted a distinction in the implementation of 
practices. As diffusion occurs, organizations can adapt practices to their particular needs 
(Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac 2010). However, not all may choose to do so. The literature 
describing the choice to customize or conform (Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell 1997), has 
been associated with a decoupling of means and ends (Meyer and Rowan 1977) to suggest 
symbolic adoption among many organizations motivated by legitimacy or loss aversion 
rather than performance (Kennedy and Fiss 2009).  
Though frequently applied in past work describing distinctions among early and 
late adopters of and environmental practice (e.g., Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2010, Toffel 
2006), these scholars do not differentiate adoption from adaptation, and cannot address the 
tension between the signaling mechanism and tailored signals. As I demonstrate, 
throughout my dissertation, key propositions from this literature can be leveraged to assess 
how adaptation of green building certifications may provide strategically tuned signals 
without undermining the signaling mechanism by creating noise.  
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I embark on this investigation in Chapter 2 by first describing the phenomenon of 
green building certification in a descriptive, rather than theoretical, way. This may be of 
interest to practitioners, and provides a clear depiction of the phenomenon on which theory 
is constructed in the remaining chapters. I then synthesize a framework for understanding 
green signals in Chapter 3. This framework reconsiders the description of green 
certification practices, bridging relevant literatures to integrate theory and practice. By 
connecting literature on disclosure, clubs, signaling, and organizations to two key 
dimensions of practice adaptation, I provide a generalizable approach to understanding 
green signals in other arenas. Data from LEED certifications apply this framework and 
demonstrate its applicability as a predictive tool describing the adaptation of a practice to 
particular organizational priorities.  
The final two chapters complete my investigation, assessing trends over time with 
respect to these two key signaling dimensions. Though the environmental impacts of 
voluntary program participation and green labels tend to diminish over time (Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho 2010, Toffel 2006), such programs were established to improve quality 
and mitigate environmental footprints. As the labels diffuse, and as participation increases, 
some have claimed that a “Race to the Top” is occurring. Others might assert that 
greenwashing explains much of the observed participation, or even that a “Race to the 
Bottom” is occurring. Chapter 4 reflects on the theoretical origins of the Race hypothesis, 
develops a perspective under which a voluntary certification could induce a Race, and 
examines evidence of a Race within LEED buildings.  
In Chapter 5, I elaborate on this analysis by providing analysis of high-resolution 
data. This chapter disaggregates LEED scores into their constituent technologies. By 
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opening this “black box,” it is possible to directly examine how practices evolve, and 
examine the extent to which adopters adhere to the original aim of the program. The 
concluding chapter reflects on the key findings of this dissertation, noting key advances in 
theory and methodologies before highlighting promising areas of next research.  
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CHAPTER 2: FOR WHAT IT’S WORTH: EVALUATING REVEALED 
PREFERENCES FOR GREEN CERTIFICATION 
 
 
In a novel assessment of green building certification pathways, we observe how 
organizations obtain Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) 
certification. We use a regression discontinuity approach to identify practices used to 
upgrade certification tiers. This analysis reveals preferences for green certification 
strategies and, we argue, intimates the perceived value of green certification. We 
distinguish practices that potentially confer private gains through returns to efficiency and 
productivity investments, from practices that only provide public benefits. Data show that 
organizations strategically certify to avoid high cost resource use, appeal to key 
stakeholders, and communicate building and organization quality. Builders upgrading to 
the highest tiers are more likely to deploy practices with private gains. Results suggest a 
willingness to extend short time horizons associated with energy efficiency investments in 
exchange for marketing benefits. Our discussion notes the capacity for certifications to 
mitigate market barriers associated with the energy efficiency gap. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Sustainably designed buildings have numerous qualities that are difficult for potential 
buyers and occupants to observe. Hidden building qualities potentially lead to a “market 
for lemons” (Akerlof 1970) in which consumers cannot distinguish green or high-quality 
buildings from traditional or low-quality ones. These information asymmetries combine 
with other market failures and barriers (including externalities, high discount rates, and 
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short time horizons), discouraging investment in energy efficiency and green building 
overall. Policy interventions seek to mitigate this gap between efficient and actualized 
levels of investment in green building (Brown 2001). Policies have traditionally been 
limited to building codes or other regulations, though market- and information-based 
instruments like labels or certifications have become increasingly popular (Matisoff, 
Noonan, and Flowers 2016).  
 Green building certifications verify sustainable qualities, communicating this 
hidden information to stakeholders (Amacher, Koskela, and Ollikainen 2004, Eichholtz, 
Kok, and Quigley 2010a, Mason 2013, Reichardt 2014b). That is, by certifying a building 
with a green label, owners quickly provide information to potential investors, tenants, 
consumers, and employees. This “signaling” may reflect on both the building and it’s 
owner or occupant (Matisoff, Noonan, and Mazzolini 2014), communicating quality at 
apparently at low costs (Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley 2010a). By clearly distinguishing 
high- from low-quality buildings, certifications provide signaling benefits such as higher 
rental or sales prices for the property, among others (Chegut, Eichholtz, and Kok 2011). 
Signaling benefits incentivize otherwise cost-prohibitive green practices (Mason 2012). 
 As a tool for promoting sustainability and as a mechanism for signaling hidden 
qualities, green building certifications have become of increasing interest to practitioners 
and scholars alike. A variety of research has noted a recent increase in buildings that are 
certified with green labels (Chegut, Eichholtz, and Kok 2011, 2014, Cidell 2009, Kahn and 
Vaughn 2009, Kok, McGraw, and Quigley 2011). In particular, the United States Green 
Building Council’s (USGBC) Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) 
label has gained significant traction in the United States. There, LEED certification labels 
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as much as five percent of the new commercial buildings, and 30 percent of the new 
commercial office space in the 30 largest metropolitan areas (Kok and Holtermans 2014b).  
The LEED program works by certifying specific building improvements that 
reduce the environmental footprint of a building. LEED certification is based the sum of 
dozens of different green practices, for which firms earn “credit” towards a composite 
score. LEED scores are then tiered into four certification levels. Some of these credits are 
thought to reduce a building’s operating costs by increasing efficiency, or are thought to 
improve employee productivity and improving indoor environmental quality. Other 
practices accepted toward LEED certification offer no such return on investment, but 
improve environmental outcomes for the surrounding community. Sustainable practices 
that offer no returns may be worthwhile if certification is leveraged to provide stakeholders 
some indication that the organization occupying the building is of elite quality, has green 
values, and is socially responsible (Potoski and Prakash 2009). Throughout, we refer to 
credits conferring potential returns as having private (versus public) benefits.   
Flexibility of certification pathways, a feature common to many green building 
certification programs, introduces variance in the environmental practices used to certify 
buildings. This presents unique challenges to scholarly understanding of certification 
strategies in the built environment. What are organizations willing to do to gain signaling 
benefits? There has been much debate about the value of green certification, with unclear 
evidence on price premiums and energy intensity (Chegut, Eichholtz, and Kok 2014, Cidell 
2009, Kahn and Vaughn 2009, Kok, McGraw, and Quigley 2011). A better understanding 
of certification pathway heterogeneity may shed light on the nuanced relationships between 
certification, market premiums, and energy efficiency. Analysis of certification pathways 
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may indicate what builders hope to gain by going green, revealing latent preferences for 
green certification and signals. 
Prior research has only identified broad patterns suggesting that certification can 
signal both building and organization quality  (Matisoff, Noonan, and Mazzolini 2014, 
Corbett and Muthulingam 2007), treating certification behavior as a “black box” process. 
In contrast to other works that assess certification outcomes like energy intensity or sales 
premiums, we focus our analysis on the strategic decisions made to certify green in 
exchange for signaling benefits. We open the black box, using a proprietary dataset from 
the USGBC to examine building-level certification choices. Such high-resolution analysis 
has been limited to a handful of studies. Cidell and Beata (2009) aggregate buildings into 
large EPA regions, and sum credits by broad categories to explain regional differences in 
the use of general types of green practices. Others have used this data for small-n studies 
(Da Silva and Ruwanpura 2009) or have not sought to explain trends in certification 
pathways (Wu et al. 2016). 
By opening the black box of green certification pathways, we contribute to a 
growing body of knowledge that seeks to understand strategic approaches to and 
motivations for environmental certification. In the following, we first introduce green 
certification and signaling, developing several hypotheses. Our methodology identifies 
practices chosen to carry a building from one tier of LEED certification to a higher tier, 
ascertaining signal value by examining changes in certification preferences at the margin. 
We demonstrate that organizations strategically adopt sustainability practices to avoid high 
cost resource use, appeal to key stakeholders, and leverage signals to communicate 
building and organizational quality. This evaluation fills gaps in scholarly understanding 
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of green signaling strategy, practitioner perceptions of green label benefits, and 
policymaker’s knowledge of outcomes under flexible program designs.  
 
2.2 Literature Review: Green Certification Signals in the Built Environment 
The built environment produces a wide array of externalities related to energy, water, air 
quality, and land use. And, many of these impacts are difficult (or impossible) to observe, 
inhibiting accurate valuation of improvements to building impacts. For instance, potential 
buyers cannot determine whether a building used sustainably harvested wood throughout 
construction at any point, and only ascertain whether the building design is energy efficient 
by assessing utility bills during occupancy. Many buyers and tenants are willing to pay 
more for greener buildings due to potential private benefits of reducing externalities, or 
simply because they value the public goods that green buildings provide (Brounen and Kok 
2010). However, information asymmetries prevent them from offering this premium to 
builders who mitigate environmental externalities. These, and related market failures and 
barriers, have been shown to yield underinvestment in energy efficiency (Hirst and Brown 
1990). Market failures likewise reduce incentive to provide public environmental 
amenities.  
 Certification serves as a signaling tool that rewards green building practices where 
numerous market failures deter sustainability. By certifying green, a builder credibly 
verifies improvements and provides a snapshot of overall quality for potential consumers 
(Matisoff, Noonan, and Mazzolini 2014). Green certifications signal potential buyers and 
tenants that a building, and its owner, are of high quality. Certification thus lowers 
information asymmetry about environmental externalities, often resulting in rental or sales 
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premiums that incentivize green building (Reichardt 2014b). By attaching a premium to 
sustainable practices, certification mechanisms bundle private incentives to the provision 
of public goods (Kotchen 2013) and reduction of externalities. In the following, we provide 
a brief introduction to certification as a signal of building quality, and of organization 
quality. Our hypotheses build on this literature to suggest strategic signaling choices.  
LEED is typically depicted as a quality or performance signal related to the building 
itself: by building green, owners gain a market return from efficiency and decreased 
production costs (Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley 2010b). LEED buildings have been 
observed to consume nearly 30% less electricity compared to real estate establishments 
matched on a wide array of covariates (Asensio and Delmas 2017).1  Other performance 
advantages associated with different LEED credits include, for example, indoor 
environmental quality that makes the building a more desirable place to work and increases 
worker productivity (Cole	 1998,	 Cidell	 and	 Beata	 2009). These private benefits to 
sustainable practices accrue even without certification, though, perhaps not surprisingly, 
rental and sales premiums tend to increase with certification (Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley 
2010b). While designers could reap benefits from green building without certification, 
information barriers may limit market returns to efficiency (Jaffe and Stavins 1994, Sallee 
2014). Labeling through LEED allows owners to reduce information asymmetry between 
producers and stakeholders by verifying improved building performance with a simplified 
																																																						
1 Other estimates have found smaller effects on energy efficiency (Kats 2003), and a 
rebound effect has also been noted: Newsham, Mancini and Birt (2003) observe greater 
energy use in about a third of commercial LEED buildings compared to general U.S. 
commercial buildings, though others found this above-average use in less than a quarter 
of LEED buildings (Turner & Frankel 2008). 
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signal of building quality (Mason 2013, Majumdar and Zhang 2009, Fuerst and McAllister 
2011a). 
Besides signaling performance qualities of buildings, LEED certification also 
indicates qualities of the owner organization, signaling quality management, strong owner 
values, positive environmental externalities, and even product quality. LEED as a signal of 
management quality and owner values has been observed through occupants’ abilities to 
attract higher quality employees (Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley 2010a). Further, Lanfranchi 
and Pekovic (2014) find that employees working for firms with green certification feel 
more useful and equitably recognized, and are more likely to work uncompensated 
overtime. LEED’s signal of environmental quality may be important for investors (Saha 
and Darnton 2005), consumers (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001), employees (Turban and 
Greening 1996), or other stakeholders (Wood 1991). This is consistent with the theory that 
demonstration of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to stakeholders is linked to 
increased economic performance (Amacher, Koskela, and Ollikainen 2004, Lyon and 
Maxwell 2008), as perceptions of facility quality impact the owner, and the owner’s goods 
and services. When LEED certification can be leveraged to signal organization quality, 
additional investments in sustainable practices may become worthwhile, whether those 
practices have tangible private benefits or not (Devine and Kok 2015).  
In the context of LEED, building quality increases with each additional point 
obtained toward certification. However, the tiered certification structure means that signals 
of building and organizational quality only change as builders move from one certification 
level to the next. While building quality improvements often provide returns with or 
without signaling, organizational quality must be labeled to provide returns. This 
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distinction is critical to the development of our hypotheses in the next section. Which 
practices are worthwhile at the margin between one level of signaling and the next, if 
potential signaling benefits drive owners to higher certification levels? 
 
2.3 Hypotheses: Expected Signaling Strategies 
The LEED certification program verifies building improvements in dozens of categories, 
corresponding to many types of environmental impacts across an immense set of available 
certification pathways. To give structure to the analysis of strategic certification, without 
losing the high resolution of credit-level data, we focus analysis on two dimensions. First, 
we examine the extent to which builders leverage credits with potential private benefits. 
Second, we examine strategies used to upgrade to higher LEED tiers, to send stronger 
signals of building or organizational quality. This approach opens the black box of green 
certification while reflecting on broader themes of interest to researchers and program 
managers. Our hypotheses test expectations that organizations strategically certify to (1) 
avoid high resource costs, (2) appeal to key stakeholders, and (3) signal that the building 
or owner is of high quality. 
2.3.1 LEED as Cost Avoidance 
All LEED credits mitigate externalities in some fashion, though some also provide 
private benefits. We distinguish between LEED credits that potentially confer private 
returns, versus credits that only benefit the broader public. Credits may confer private 
benefits by reducing operating costs or improving occupant productivity. For example, 
energy efficiency reduces utility bills to cut costs in the long run. On the other hand, habitat 
protection strategies offer no such return to the building owner. Practices that do not 
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provide inherent returns are only worthwhile when bundled to private signaling benefits 
through certification. We provide a complete delineation of LEED credits in terms of 
potential return in the description of our data. 
Notably, some in the buildings industry assert that there are no returns to the 
individual practices that constitute LEED certification. Because potential returns are small 
compared to upfront costs, and because returns are delivered over a long time-horizon, 
these building owners may discount potential returns to the point of negation. The emphasis 
on short time horizons and the use of high discount rates has been identified as a key 
contributor to the energy efficiency gap (Hirst and Brown 1990). From this perspective, 
the only gains of certification come from market premiums.  
Our hypothesis, in contrast, is that LEED construction is leveraged to avoid high 
resource costs. Private benefits of efficiency increase when prices are high. If greater 
efficiency is implemented in locations associated with higher energy or water prices, we 
take this as evidence that certification is strategically leveraged to avoid high resource 
costs. If this hypothesis is upheld, returns to efficiency practices recognized by LEED must 
exist. Note that our expectation is consistent with past observations that adoption of 
efficiency practices increases when average prices are high for energy (Ito 2014)  and water 
(Arrow 1966). While electricity rates vary by state and utility provider, water prices tend 
to be higher in urban areas with higher stormwater and wastewater management costs (Roy 
et al. 2003). 
H1a: Energy efficiency credits are more popular in states with high electricity prices. 
H1b: Water efficiency credits are more popular in urban areas with high water prices. 
2.3.2 Customization for Stakeholder Appeal 
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As introduced above, organizations face many motivations for certifying LEED, 
and may do so to cater to numerous types of stakeholders. LEED’s flexibility enables 
participating builders to customize certification pathways, choosing credits that produce 
outcomes desired by those stakeholders. Certification then verifies that a building has high 
quality (Spence 1973), and that the producing organization is of elite status (Potoski and 
Prakash 2009). Yet because LEED is typically studied as a black box process, we do not 
know the extent to which organizations customize certification pathways. While some 
argue that participants simply follow a pathway that reaches certification at least upfront 
cost, we expect organizations to leverage certification to signal key stakeholder groups 
interested in various performance qualities.  
LEED buildings serve many functions, which have variable design needs, and 
provide services to diverse consumers. For example, a LEED certified apartment building 
may be more desirable to prospective tenants if the design emphasizes efficiency and 
indoor environmental quality. Hospitals and hotels may use similar strategies in appealing 
to their patients and guests. By contrast, government agencies may want to signal 
community stakeholders, emphasizing public goods rather than private gains. Our 
hypotheses illustrate the notion that certification is used to appeal to some core group of 
stakeholders, which demand either private or public benefits. Other hypothesis testing is 
possible based on available data; we test a litany of predictions derived from the same 
logic, and present the highlights in the results and discussion. 
H2a: Residential buildings obtain more credits with private benefits for tenants. 
H2b: Government buildings obtain more credits that have purely public benefits. 
2.3.3 Signaling through Strategic Upgrades 
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Those willing to invest additional resources to reach a higher tier can reap 
marketing benefits by signaling greater performance (Matisoff, Noonan, and Mazzolini 
2014, Corbett and Muthulingam 2007). Stakeholders may be more willing to pay, work 
for, or invest in organizations that can demonstrate green practices as part of a broader set 
of CSR initiatives  (Saha and Darnton 2005, Sen and Bhattacharya 2001, Turban and 
Greening 1996, Wood 1991). Though two buildings may have nearly-identical 
environmental footprints, one may obtain an extra credit, upgrading to a higher certification 
tier, and signaling far greener than its peer. To gain the benefits of green signaling, many 
are induced to make additional improvements, obtaining just enough credits to upgrade to 
a higher level of LEED (Matisoff, Noonan, and Mazzolini 2014).  
Past work by Matisoff et al. (2014) demonstrates that certain ownership types are 
more likely to participate in this upgrading for signal benefits. Those making upgrades for 
signaling are henceforth termed “signalers.” We here assert that systematic differences 
should also exist in sustainable practices chosen between signalers and non-signalers. The 
probability of obtaining any particular LEED credit increases continuously and 
monotonically with the number of credits obtained. Likewise, the environmental impact, 
general building quality, and owner quality may increase continuous with each marginal 
LEED point. However, the signal sent by certification is discontinuous, increasing only as 
a project moves up a tier in the certification system. Identifying marginal credits chosen to 
carry a firm to a higher certification tier can demonstrate how organizations value green 
signals. Put differently, differences in credit attainment between signalers and non-
signalers reveal what the signal is worth, by identifying which sustainable practices 
organizations are willing to adopt in exchange for signaling benefits.  
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Which sustainable practices are organizations willing to adopt for signaling 
benefits, which they are otherwise reluctant to pursue? We assume that a profit-maximizing 
firm adopts only practices deemed cost effective through private returns or signaling 
benefits. This allows us to draw on marginal differences in LEED credit adoption across 
certification thresholds to better understand the value green signals. Signalers may 
strategically select marginal credits that provide private returns, or may find other 
certification pathways to be more cost effective. Credits that do not yield returns ordinarily 
may be bundled to green signals that indicate high firm and product quality to become cost 
effective. By providing exclusive status in exchange for public good provision (Potoski 
and Prakash 2005b), credits providing only public benefits become more attractive 
components of certification pathways. Organizations facing greater quality competition, 
such as for-profit firms, may be more likely to pursue these signaling benefits (Matisoff, 
Noonan, and Mazzolini 2014). 
H3: Credits providing only public benefits are more common among “signalers.” 
Recall that numerous market failures drive the need for green building policies like 
certification programs. As such, programs like LEED have multiple goals. Because some 
green practices cannot provide a return on investment, certification programs seek to 
provide private benefits for addressing public concerns. If signalers upgrade through 
credits with no private benefits, certification is an effective tool for addressing this market 
failure. However, certifications also incentivize greater energy efficiency in the face of 
short time-horizons and high discount rates that correspond to the energy efficiency gap 
(Hirst and Brown 1990). If the marginal efficiency measures are especially high cost, these 
mitigation practices have returns that only emerge over a much longer time horizon. Firms 
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may not wish to adopt higher cost efficiency measures unless they certify at a higher level, 
because they are averse to these long-term investments with relatively low returns 
(Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer 2009). For the program to meet this goal, some signaling 
benefits must be associated with efficiency credits that provide modest returns. If so, we 
anticipate some signalers to upgrade through efficiency measures.  
H4: Credits with low or long-run returns are more common among “signalers.” 
The expectations in Hypotheses 3 and 4 are only partially opposed to one another. 
There may be some organization types that become signalers through different strategies. 
Or, some certification thresholds may justify different types of investment. We explore this 
further in our analysis, results, and discussion. In the next section, we describe our data, 
which is uniquely situated to answer the questions presented. Then, we develop a 
methodology for identifying the marginal credit obtained toward certification before 
testing hypotheses.  
 
2.4 Data and Methodology 
The USGBC Green Building Information Gateway for the LEED New Construction 
version 2.2 certification program is the primary source of data for this study. Though data 
for other versions of LEED could be used, we restrict analysis to a single version for 
consistent comparison among green building pathways selected by designers. This version 
of the LEED standards allows a building to achieve up to 69 total points, with thresholds 
at 26, 33, 39, and 52 points representing the Certified, Silver, Gold, and Platinum tiers of 
certification, respectively. These thresholds correspond to 40%, 50%, 60%, and 80% of 
available “base” points (which exclude innovation credits), rather than to natural cut-points 
	 28 
in sustainable design. Under this system, builders must strategically pick and choose 
sustainable design practices until the desired certification level is reached. 
Data include all information for nearly three thousand LEED certified buildings, 
including categorical information on building owner, use, location, size, and whether the 
project was publicly or confidentially certified. We pair each LEED observation with local 
average electricity price data from the Energy Information Administration. This allows 
tests for a relationship between energy prices and the adoption of energy efficiency LEED 
credits. Water prices, typically higher in urban areas, are proxied with an ordinal measure 
of development density provided by the USGBC. This measure ranges on a seven-point 
scale from very rural to large metropolitan area. Data also include building scorecards, 
reporting precisely which of the 69 possible LEED points were attained as part of 
certification. Some of these credits correspond to private returns from efficiency or 
productivity improvements; others do not. 
2.4.1 Classifying LEED Credits 
We first assess differences in certification strategies that increase efficiency or 
productivity, netting private returns even without signaling benefits. When it could be 
argued that a LEED credit improves efficient use of natural or human resources, the credit 
is classified as producing private benefits. Using this logic, two types of credits exist by 
which LEED credits may provide such returns: cost-saving credits related to efficiency that 
decrease energy or water utility bills, and user experience credits related to indoor 
environmental improvements that enhance occupant productivity. The complete 
delineation of each LEED credit type is summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 2.1. LEED Credit Categorization by forms of returns. The number of points 








Purely Public  
Returns 
      
Optimize energy performance 10 Air delivery monitoring 1 Refrigerant management 1 
On-Site renewable energy 3 Increased ventilation 1 Green power purchasing 1 
Enhanced commissioning  1 Low-emitting materials 4 Construction air quality 2 
Measurement & verification 1 Thermal comfort 2 Indoor chemicals 1 
Controllability of systems 2 Daylight and views 2 Construction waste 2 
Innovation and design 4 Development density 1 Renewable materials 1 
LEED AP 1 Alternative transit 4 Certified wood 1 
Building reuse 3   Site selection 1 
Materials reuse 3   Brownfield 1 
Regional materials 2   Habitat protection 2 
Water-efficient landscape 2   Stormwater design 2 
Wastewater technologies 1   Non-roof heat island 1 
Water use reduction 2     
Rooftop heat island 1     
Light pollution reduction 1     
 
 
Cost-saving credits are identified in several forms. First, they may provide private 
returns by lowering electric utility costs through envelop efficiency, commissioned energy 
planning, and on-site renewable production. Second, efficient landscaping, low-flow 
internal water use, and innovative wastewater technology may similarly reduce water bills. 
Third, some credits lower costs in less obvious ways. Innovation and design credits 
frequently represent additional efficiency efforts in our data; reuse of materials during 
renovations avoid purchasing costs; reduction of rooftop heat island effects lowers the 
cooling cost of the building; reduction of light pollution limits wasted power for lighting; 
	 30 
and indoor system controls for lighting and temperature provide comfortable conditions 
with minimal intervention.  
User experience credits, on the other hand, enhance productivity by improving 
indoor environmental conditions. Green buildings emphasize indoor air quality through 
low emitting materials and improved ventilation. High quality interiors may also provide 
thermal comfort and controls, views of the outdoors, and lighting improvements. 
Neighborhood characteristics including development density, walkability, and access to 
alternative transit may also be preferred by users. Credits in this category are thought to 
reduce employee absences, attract better quality employees, enhance retention, and 
improve employee productivity (Turban and Greening 1996, Lanfranchi and Pekovic 
2014). Though not every credit listed in the cost-saving or user experience category yields 
a return for every building, we distinguish credits by their potential to provide a return. 
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the data, focusing on distributions of 
obtained credits which potentially provide private benefits. For various owner and use 
categories of LEED buildings, the table shows mean LEED score and mean percent of 
score from credits that associated with private benefits (%Private). Statistically significant 
differences in subsample and population means are indicated. Notably, homes and hotels 
appear to attain above-average credits conferring private returns. Schools, hospitals, 
government facilities, and confidentially certified projects score below-average in terms of 




Table 2.2.  Means of LEED Project Points and percent of score from credits with private 
returns, with tests for significant differences of subsample means compared to the overall 
sample. 
(Sub) Sample N LEED Score %Private 
All 2981 38.36 68.76 
 
Government 1694 38.67 *** 68.56 ** 
For-Profit 554 37.21 *** 69.11 
Nonprofit 496 38.82 * 68.98  
Other Owner 237 37.91 68.98 
 
Confidential 581 37.44 *** 68.19 *** 
Signaler 
 
1432 37.16 *** 68.71 
Civic 419 38.20 69.06 
Commercial 653 38.96 *** 68.70 
Education 653 38.77 * 68.43 * 
Healthcare 164 36.54 *** 67.79 ** 
Hospitality 66 36.75 ** 70.77 ** 
Industrial 110 38.02 68.63 
Residential 170 38.12 71.00 *** 
Retail 108 35.75 *** 68.47  




We compare prices and the adoption of LEED credits with private returns, observed 
as the total number of credits attained, the number of credits attained in LEED’s Energy 
and Atmosphere (EA) and Water Efficiency (WE) categories, the total credits obtained that 
confer private returns, the total credits obtained that only provide public benefits, and the 
share of credits obtained that confer private returns (%Private). Each of these variables is 
correlated to some extent with energy prices and urban density (a proxy for water prices). 
Correlation values and indications of statistically significant covariance are listed in Table 
3. Investment in EA credits, which mostly confer private returns, is positively correlated 
with local electricity prices. Urban developments tend to have more EA and WE credits, 
but lower LEED scores overall.   
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Table 2.3. LEED Credits Correlations with building setting, including measures of 
resource costs. 
  Electricity Price Urban Density Building Size 
Energy & Atmosphere 0.083 *** 0.035 * -0.047 *** 
Water Efficiency -0.028   0.117 *** -0.035 * 
LEED Score 0.037 * -0.077 *** 0.025  
Credit Count: Private Returns 0.085 *** -0.055 *** 0.020  
%Private 0.125 *** 0.024 -0.044 ** 
No ROI 0.001  -0.096 *** 0.077 *** 




Table 2.4. Mean Credits earned by Various Owner Organizations and difference 
from population mean. T-statistics are listed in parentheses. 
 Building Sector 
LEED Credit Category All      Gov. Firm School Industry Home 


































































































We test whether certification pathways are customized to building types with 
respect to each credit category. With so many credits on the LEED scorecard, this process 
demands hundreds of t-tests to reveal statistically significant differences in pathway 
strategy. A few of the highlights of these tests are reported in Table 4, which compares 
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subsample means to the full population. This table focuses on our interest in credit 
attainment patterns among residences, government facilities, and other groups within the 
data, such as confidentially certified buildings. 
2.4.3 Patterns in Organizational Performance Signaling 
To assess strategic signaling decisions, we narrow analysis to the thresholds 
between LEED certification levels. We observe differences in signalers, compared to those 
who do not upgrade, by employing a regression discontinuity test from Porter (2003). The 
dependent variable in this analysis is the probability of obtaining individual credits, or the 
propensity to obtain credits within certain groups. This approach reveals preferences for 
green certification by indicating the marginal green practices pursued for signaling 
purposes. By assuming that, on average, builders obtain LEED credits until the marginal 
utility of the credit equals the marginal cost of the credit, we can observe the additional 
value from signaling at a higher tier as related to jumps in credit attainment at thresholds. 
That is, we assume that owner investments in green practices amount to what a green signal 
is worth to the owner. Because building quality and environmental impacts change only 
modestly with each additional credit, significant jumps in propensity to attain a credit at a 
threshold reveal preferences for signaling. We are also able to assess related trends based 
on building owner type, building use, and a few other project attributes.  
The regression discontinuity test estimates separate local regressions from the left 
and from the right of a given treatment threshold. In the LEED setting, the treatment is the 
additional signaling, awarded at the point threshold between each certification tier (33 for 
Silver, 39 for Gold, or 52 for Platinum). By smoothing from the left-hand and right-hand 
sides of the threshold, this method produces two different expected values for the 
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dependent variable at the certification threshold. The magnitude of the difference between 
the expected values, α, reveals whether a project attribute is more likely or less to be 
observed among signalers. When statistically significant, α reveals which practices are 
leveraged to obtain signaling benefits, though those credits were not revealed to be strategic 
at lower tiers. A positive α means that there is a disproportionately large increase in 
observations of its kind above the threshold. An α below zero would indicate a paucity of 
observations above the threshold. For example, an α of 0.23 would indicate that the 
probability of obtaining a LEED credit increases by 23 percentage points as a builder 
chooses to upgrade beyond the threshold under examination.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Achievement of LEED Points associated with potential private returns 




The Porter (2003) approach has several advantages. First, we can observe shifts in 
the distribution at each individual LEED threshold, for any project characteristic. Second, 
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we can statistically identify discontinuities that may not be visually apparent. For example, 
in Figure 1, it is not clear whether the share of credits attained that have private benefits 
(%Private) changes at all as LEED scores change from Certified to Silver, Silver to Gold, 
or Gold to Platinum. However, significant differences may exist. Third, by smoothing from 
both sides of the threshold, we control for differences in density of observations above and 
below the threshold, and additionally control for the loss of degrees of freedom when 
choosing pathways to higher LEED scores.  
Analysis requires assumptions about the appropriate bandwidth chosen for local 
smoothing. Results are somewhat sensitive to this choice: larger bandwidths include more 
data and often have more precise fits. However, in a multi-tier setting, increasing the 
bandwidth risks bias by including data from regions of the distribution influenced by 
adjacent thresholds. This bias might obscure localized discontinuities. To this end, we opt 
for a three-point bandwidth at the Silver and Gold tiers (33 and 39 points, respectively), 
the smallest bandwidth that reliably describes patterns in the multitier framework. For the 
Platinum threshold (52 points), which is farther from (and less influenced by trends related 
to) other thresholds, we increase the bandwidth to four points. This in part compensates for 
the absence of any observations scoring 51 points, just a single credit shy of the Platinum 




In the above descriptive statistics, we observe evidence that LEED is used to avoid high 
cost resource use, and appeal to key stakeholder groups, confirming our first two groups 
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of hypotheses. In Table 3, we observe that building owners facing high electricity prices 
are more likely to draw on energy efficiency improvements and related LEED credits 
associated with a potential return. Owners certifying in more densely developed urban 
areas (where water prices tend to be higher), are more likely to adopt water efficiency 
technologies. Notably, there appears to be some indication that urban projects have lower 
LEED scores, obtaining fewer credits overall. That the results are negative and significant 
for credits with both private and purely public benefits, yet the result for %Private is 
insignificant, suggests that urban developments do not vary systematically from rural 
developments in terms of prioritization of returns. On the other hand, larger buildings 
appear to rely less heavily on private returns. This may suggest diseconomies of scale for 
some efficiency technologies. Because owners appear to respond to prices through 
efficiency, we take these results as an overall confirmation that private returns exist and 
are recognized for at least some of the LEED credits. 
 In Table 4, we observe small but statistically strong differences in LEED 
certification pathways across owners and building uses. For example, government projects 
score on average 0.25 higher than the general population mean LEED score (Table 2), yet 
they tend to achieve fewer credits for Innovation & Design and Sustainable Sites. They 
perform especially poorly in public transportation credits, and rarely attain building reuse 
and materials reuse credits. High LEED scores for government agencies rely on Energy 
and Atmosphere, Indoor Environmental Quality, Materials and Resources, and Water 





Table 2.5.  Regression Discontinuity Tests across LEED certification tiers. Note that α 
values were computed at bandwidth of 3 for thresholds at Silver and Gold; bandwidth of 4 
was used for the Platinum threshold. Values for α correspond to the additional probability 
of obtaining a credit in order to obtain the listed certification tier, compared to observations 
just shy of the tier.  
 α – Discontinuity Magnitude at Threshold 
Project attribute   Silver     Gold Platinum 
Private Returns 0.068   0.168   8.691 *** 
%Private 0.003  0.004  0.174 *** 
Purely Public Returns 0.160  -0.240  -4.125 *** 
%Public 0.005  0.006  -0.083 *** 
User Experience -0.343  -0.124  0.393   
Cost-savings 0.412   0.293   8.298 *** 
Energy & Atmosphere 0.224  -0.398  7.417 *** 
Indoor Environment 0.399 ** -0.501 *** -2.112 *** 
Materials & Resources -0.812 *** 0.454 *** 0.688   
Innovation & Design 0.242 * 0.180 * 1.597 *** 
Sustainable Sites -0.619 *** 0.304 * -3.720 *** 
Water Efficiency 0.662 *** -0.004  -0.779 *** 
Confidential 0.031  -0.066  -0.620 *** 
Energy price 1.249 ** 0.071  6.309 *** 
Certification year -0.140  -0.164 * -1.463 *** 
Government -0.015   -0.051   -1.001 *** 
For-Profit -0.119 ** 0.074 ** 0.177 ** 
Nonprofit 0.140 *** -0.017  0.754 *** 
Other -0.006   -0.007   0.069   
Civic 0.127 ** -0.159 *** -0.775 *** 
Commercial 0.096 ** 0.107 ** 0.241 *** 
Education -0.052  -0.022  0.037   
Healthcare 0.054 ** 0.002  0.048   
Hospitality 0.031 ** -0.002  0.019   
Industrial 0.063 ** -0.042 ** 0.024   
Residential -0.255 *** 0.022  0.283 *** 




By comparison, firms appear to use the opposite strategy, scoring low where 
government buildings tend to score high, and vice-versa. Schools place most focus on 
indoor environments and user experience, affirming that school certification is used to 
improve student health and comfort. Industrial projects place very little emphasis on the 
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indoor environment, but emphasize water efficiency. Residential buildings emphasize 
efficiency and user experience, though they have lower overall LEED scores compared to 
other buildings. Taken together, these results confirm our hypotheses by demonstrating 
certification pathway customization to key stakeholder interests. 
On average, buildings do not exhaust opportunities for either private benefits or 
purely public benefits at any point total, as observed in Figure 1. Instead, they select a  
combination of building improvements, with a consistent extent of investment in credits 
that do and do not confer private returns across LEED scores. While Figure 1 does not 
clearly reveal major discontinuities on visual inspection, the Porter test offers a formal 
measure of this trend, and facilitates comparison between signalers and non-signalers, in 
terms of numerous project attributes. Results of these tests, including evidence of 
Hypotheses 3 and 4, are shown in Table 5. 
Discontinuities in credit attainment patterns reveal signaling strategies. The data 
suggest that some credits are especially likely to increase in popularity when building 
owners upgrade to higher certification tiers. As coded, signalers’ strategies do not appear 
to leverage credits with private benefits overall. However, some individual credits and 
credit categories do show statistically significant differences in adoption patterns as 
buildings cross a certification threshold. At the Silver level, signalers are more likely to 
select credits for Indoor Environmental Quality, Innovation & Design, and Water 
Efficiency. On the other hand, these buildings also tend to have significantly fewer 
Materials & Resources and Sustainable Sites credits, compared to those who do not 
upgrade from Certified. The low-tier signalers appear drawn to credits with purely public 
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benefits (in support of Hypothesis 3), but appear to avoid materials and thermal comfort 
credits. 
At the higher tiers, different patterns emerge. Gold signalers more frequently 
leverage Materials and Site Selection credits, but less often choose improvements to Indoor 
Environmental Quality, including thermal comfort credits. When projects upgrade to 
Platinum2, the focus on Indoor Environmental Quality drops, and Green Power Purchasing 
credits become over 70% less likely. To reach the highest tier, owners switch signaling 
strategies, increasing energy efficiency from the Energy and Atmosphere credits far 
beyond what is adopted in LEED Gold buildings. In fact, Platinum signalers obtain on 
average eight more credits from the private benefits category compared to those obtained 
by LEED buildings certified at the higher reaches of the Gold tier. In addition to the other 
results from various credits and categories, this confirms the expectations from Hypothesis 
4. 
Threshold discontinuities can be observed along various other project attributes. 
Past work identified these tendencies for owner type (Matisoff, Noonan, and Mazzolini 
2014), which we replicate somewhat. We also divide the sample by building type: 
commercial office buildings tend upgrade for signaling benefits at every level of 
certification, but civic buildings tend only to upgrade for Silver certification. Residential 
and industrial buildings are especially unlikely to be signalers. Education and retail 
facilities reveal no significant preferences for upgrading for signaling benefits. 
																																																						
2 At the highest certification tier, a paucity of observations on either side of the Platinum 
threshold limit interpretability of result magnitudes. The extension of the smoothing 
bandwidth to four credits partially adjusts for the small dataset, and significance is robust 





The data provide a glimpse into the revealed preferences for signaling, and our analysis 
provides unique insight into organizations’ green certification strategies. Most research is 
only able to observe whether certification occurs, along with occasional metrics or 
environmental or financial performance. In contrast to some assertions that certification 
pathways are homogeneous or non-strategic, these results demonstrate that owners change 
building practices to minimize costs, signal key stakeholders, and accrue green signaling 
benefits. Lessons from this analysis have implications for builders seeking to strategically 
signal, policymakers designing programs to address market failures, and scholars 
researching green labels and signaling. We address each of these in turn. 
Our data show that efficient design practices are more popular under high resource 
prices. This suggests that, even when upfront costs are high, returns on investment in 
energy and water efficiency are an important factor in an organization’s decision to “go 
green.” However, not all LEED credits increase efficiency or otherwise provide a return. 
LEED’s flexibility fosters variance in certification pathways, some of which may provide 
higher or faster returns. This gives builders opportunities to strategically reach certification 
through customized pathways. 
We observe that different types of buildings leverage certification differently, with 
no singularly “best route” to LEED certification. LEED certification pathway decisions 
appear influenced by the owning organization, its goals, and its stakeholders. Organizations 
can match how they certify to their underlying motivations for certification: schools can 
provide healthier environments for students, firms can differentiate themselves as 
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innovators in a crowded industry, and home-owners can save on utilities, all within the 
same certification program. Such flexibility may be critical to encouraging widespread 
adoption among builders, but also creates highly variable environmental impacts from one 
LEED building to the next. Customization towards LEED certification has created “noisy” 
signals, variably indicating qualities to differentiated stakeholder groups, and potentially 
explaining some of the divergence in existing literature that aims to quantify environmental 
and marketing outcomes of LEED certification. 
To illustrate this signal noise and its potential causes, take for example the 
difference in government and firm certification pathways. These owner types share few 
certification habits, potentially due to different procurement policies, or different views on 
what constitutes a viable return on investment. Differing managerial perspectives between 
the public and private sectors may drive the divergence in certification pathways, as public 
managers find ways to justify very different sustainability practices compared to firm 
decision makers. The popularity of innovation credits may be explained by where they pay 
off (in the for-profit sector) versus where they are difficult to justify (for government 
agencies). Firms may face shorter time-horizons or use higher discount rates compared to 
government agencies, due to the shareholders they must appease. Governments, on the 
other hand, may face more political pressures to make popular decisions. This may explain 
why governments are much less likely than firms to obtain Sustainable Site credits (if 
government groups site offices using political calculus to meet constituent needs, rather 
than heading best practices in urban planning or providing transit access for employees). 
The regression discontinuity results may be particularly interesting to policy 
makers and scholars. We find distinct preferences for some practices as organizations 
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upgrade to higher tiers of certification. This analysis may be understood as revealed 
preference for green signaling: the marginal credit organizations are willing to obtain to 
reach a threshold should be equal to the associated increase in signaling benefits. The 
results indicate what the signal is worth to various builders. Governments obtain high 
energy and water efficiency credits at all LEED scores, whereas firms draw on efficiency 
measures mostly to reach higher certification tiers. It appears that the signaling benefits of 
LEED certification may offset high discount rates for energy and water efficiency 
improvements  (Sallee 2014, Jaffe and Stavins 1994, Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer 
2009, Allcott and Greenstone 2012). By amplifying the visibility of building and 
organizational quality to key stakeholders, LEED certification expedites returns to 
enhanced efficiency, making even low-return and long-time horizon practices more 
attractive to organizations that would not ordinarily pursue them. Tiered information-based 
program designs similar to LEED certification may therefore prove useful in reducing the 
energy efficiency gap. 
Signaling benefits do not incentivize all organizations equally. As Matisoff et al. 
(2014) demonstrated, some owner types are more willing than others to make upgrades in 
pursuit of green signaling. Our analysis finds that the types of practices used for upgrading 
signals also vary. Although upgrades to the highest certification tiers tend to come from 
energy efficiency, projects certifying at lower tiers are more willing to pursue credits that 
offer no potential private return. Preferred practices among Silver signalers mitigate 
environmental footprints and provide positive externalities for the community. Such public 
goods are not ordinarily provided by the private sector. This suggests that public good 
	 43 
provision is also incentivized by bundling public goods to private investments through 
clear information signals, as in LEED certification.  
By observing LEED certification pathways, we gain insight into the underlying 
motivations for green signaling, intimating the targets of green signals. Our methodology 
extends regression discontinuity approaches to reveal preferences that drive signaling 
behavior. Results suggest how organizations value signals by determining what they are 
willing to do to gain certification. Yet this method does not directly explain why signalers 
are more dependent on efficiency, but only at higher tiers. Nor is it clear why other credits 
(like indoor environmental quality) are less favored at higher tiers. These statistical tests 
reveal meaningful relationships that reflect the efficacy of certification programs to address 
market failures, but do not identify causal relationships. Careful identification of green 
signaling mechanisms is left to future inquiry. 
Theoretical developments in learning, technology diffusion, and signaling will 
enhance scholarly understanding of complex policy approaches like LEED. First, the 
LEED credit selection process is not obvious, though explanations may arise from the study 
of networks, identifying learning and diffusion patterns within and across markets for green 
building. Second, the existence of confidentially certified green buildings, who are 
sustainable but cannot advertise their LEED status, is a perplexing observation that 
challenges assumptions about LEED as a signal. Future work may leverage confidentially 
certified buildings to clarify motivations for green practices and green signaling.  Finally, 
from a signaling perspective, we note that LEED produces noisy signals, yet signaling 
theory suggests that only clear and homogenous signals are of value. This contrasts with 
LEED’s rising popularity and notable market premiums. Can a nuanced theory of green 
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signals help answer this discrepancy? More than just philosophical parley, the answers to 
these questions will aid practitioners in the design of policy programs and in the 
implementation of sustainable development initiatives.  
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The decision to certify green or voluntary participate in an environmental program is often 
considered a quality signal that can help gain marketing premiums. However, the economic 
theory on signaling is best suited for qualities that are unidimensional, rather than 
multifaceted or multidimensional characteristics like sustainability. Past work has 
considered the multidimensional nature of some qualities as "noise" that crowds out signals 
of quality. This chapter revisits the treatment of signal noise in an assessment of the quality 
improvements made toward green certification. An organizational perspective on signaling 
theory provides the foundations of a framework for noisy signals, which integrates existing 
literature on signaling, club theory, and information disclosure. This framework provides 
a way to assess differences in practice adaptation in two-dimensional space. That 
technologies selected toward certification are demonstrated to match organizations' 
stakeholder demands suggests that signals are fine-tuned to meet strategic aims. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Labels of corporate sustainability and social responsibility are increasingly popular across 
markets (Darnall 2016). This trend has captured the attention of various threads of 
disciplinary and interdisciplinary research. As a matter of practice, many have studied the 
diffusion of the green technologies, the learning curves depicting adoption trends (Boss 
1980, Cantono and Silverberg 2009), and the environmental performance of adopters 
(Koehler 2007). Through various theoretical lenses, many have studied the financial 
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performance of adopters (Flammer 2013, 2015), the environmental performance of 
adopters (King and Toffel 2009), the motivations to adopt (Koehler 2007), and the 
governance of these programs themselves (Bernstein and Cashore 2007).  
Despite this variety, most literature accept green labels as a type of signaling 
strategy firms enact to distinguish themselves as having higher quality (Darnall and Carmin 
2005). In cases in which the true qualities of goods cannot be easily observed, a potential 
“market for lemons” exists that inhibits consumers’ ability to ascertain high- and low-
quality goods and services (Akerlof 1970). This induces a pooling equilibrium in which 
consumers pay the same, regardless of quality, leaving firms little incentive to improve 
hidden characteristics (Spence 1973). A key characteristic of quality signals is that the 
quality of the good is only perceived through user experience (Lee 2001). Direct benefits 
from some improvements to performance and quality can accrue to users, but returns may 
not be fully appropriated by producers without overcoming information asymmetry 
(Stiglitz 2000).  
By introducing a quality label as a market signal, a separating equilibrium can be 
established to confer premiums to high-quality goods and services. These premiums may 
exist as higher price, increased market share, greater availability of financial capital, 
improved government relations, or even lower wages for employees who derive utility 
from working at a quality firm. Importantly, the signaling theory that Spence (1973) 
articulates hinges on consumers willing to pay for qualities they may benefit from directly.   
In the case of environmental labels, this pertains to the numerous production and 
processing externalities related to the good’s lifecycle, as well as potential public and 
common goods impacted by the firm’s operations. Green labels denote qualities bundled 
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to the good itself (Kotchen 2013). Because a precise definition of “sustainability” is elusive 
(Norton 2015) these labels have come to denote a wide array of characteristics. Labels vary 
in the extent to which they are self-reported versus externally certified, and vary by the 
number of characteristics they consider, among others (Ji and Darnall 2017). As a result, 
there are often multiple labels available for any particular product. For example, green 
buildings in the U.S. are labeled with Energy Star certification that benchmarks energy 
efficiency, Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification that 
takes a holistic approach to verifying environmental footprint improvements, and a variety 
of other labels with similar approaches to LEED but with slightly different certification 
requirements. 
As labels diffuse, their efficacy as a signaling strategy hinges on continued 
consumer recognition and understanding. That is, if consumers cannot determine what a 
label means, or if they cannot recall which among the many labels are meaningful, they 
will not accept the label as a signal of quality, and will not be more willing to pay for the 
suggestion of that quality. This reestablishes the pooling equilibrium as low-quality firms 
“crowd out” signals from veritable improvements (Akerlof 1970). So long as a separating 
equilibrium exists, rent-seeking firms face incentives to overstate their quality in order to 
gain access to premiums conferred by labelling (Stiglitz 2000). Such ‘free-riding’ has been 
termed greenwash (Lyon and Montgomery 2015), though numerous definitions of this term 
exist (Kim and Lyon 2015). Where product (environmental) quality is heterogeneous 
among labelled items, the resulting signal is considered “noisy,” and consumers cannot 
accurately interpret value from the signals, undermining the effectiveness of the signal 
(Akerlof 1970).  
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Although this suggests that signals of green product quality ought to be 
homogenous to be effective, the qualities that make a product sustainable are immensely 
varied, and evolving (Norton 2015). Much work has examined the institutional design of 
labels, suggesting enforcement mechanisms that limit free-riding (Darnall, Potoski, and 
Prakash 2009) and governance mechanisms to improve legitimacy (Bernstein and Cashore 
2007). But these do not address the heterogeneity of qualities within products that 
demonstrate sufficient sustainability for certification: often, labels and certification 
programs offer flexibility for firms seeking to improve many (not all) qualities (Potoski 
and Prakash 2009). As a result, signals may be less correlated with latent product quality 
(Karamanos 2003), as flexibility permits customization, as organizations “tune” their 
approaches to sustainability to their particular needs, goals, concerns, or stakeholder 
demands.  
In the case of green buildings, heterogeneous product quality has at times cast 
doubts on the efficacy of the labeling systems. Some green certified buildings save 
tremendous amounts of energy when compared against a matched sample (Asensio and 
Delmas 2017). However, a rebound effect has been suggested, in which certified (or 
efficient) buildings in cases use far more power than their uncertified counterparts (Kats 
2003). Yet this performance heterogeneity has not demonstrably undermined the value of 
green labels: premiums have been observed through enhanced rental and sales rates 
(Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley 2010a), increased occupancy (Eichholtz, Kok, and Yonder 
2012), and improved worker productivity and satisfaction (Singh et al. 2010). This 
contradiction, generally unaddressed in past research, justifies further consideration. Can 
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noisy signals play valuable roles for firms seeking to reliably demonstrate quality to 
consumers? If so, how?  
In the following, a framework for understanding noisy signals is synthesized from 
literature on practice adaptation. Key measures of adaptation, fidelity and extensiveness, 
are shown to be related to central discussions of corporate sustainability: environmental 
disclosure and green clubs. Linking these perspectives with traditional understanding of 
signaling, the following synthesizes a framework for understanding noisy signals of 
product quality. As an application, data on green building (LEED) certifications are 
assessed through the framework to demonstrate how organizations may tune signals to 
specific stakeholder interests, without crowding out signals from other certification 
pathways.  
 
3.2 Practice Adoption and Adaptation 
Traditional signaling perspectives assume signals as binary, either present or absent. In this 
sense, labels signal the homogeneous adoption of specific quality improvements. Past 
literature describes the probability of adopting a practice, or else describes the processes 
by which practices diffuse to new adopters (Ryan and Gross 1943, Rogers 1976). Recent 
work has pivoted from describing adoption, a process that implements existing technology 
in new places, to describing adaptation, a process that in which technologies evolve as they 
diffuse (Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac 2010).  
This adaptation has been described in a variety of ways, throughout the literature 
on institutional sociology. Most often, this body of literature distinguishes between a 
practice as implemented among early adopters, and its implementation among late 
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adopters. As Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell (1997) note in a study of Total Quality 
Management, early adopters are prone to tailoring the practice to fit particular needs, while 
late adopters are more likely to adopt some pre-established, dominant form of the practice. 
Customized approaches are often considered more substantive, in that they are more likely 
to accomplish the original aims of the program (Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell 1997). By 
contrast, adoption by conformity is often considered symbolic (Delmas and Montes-
Sancho 2010), as the means of adoption become decoupled from the ends of adoption 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Bromley and Powell 2012).  
This phenomenon is explained by theory describing shifts in the motivations to 
adopt. Early adopters tailoring their approach are motivated by a sincere desire to achieve 
some goal set forth by the program, but late adopters may be influenced to adopt in 
response to a variety of social pressures, rather than technical opportunities (Kennedy and 
Fiss 2009, Tolbert and Zucker 1983).  These social pressures arise as adoption becomes 
increasingly expected, either due to normative and mimetic processes or policy coercion 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In response to coercion, organizations may adopt to-rule 
(Roy 1952) but avoid adoption at depth (Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell 1997). In response 
to other social pressures, organizations may adopt to gain legitimacy (Tolbert and Zucker 
1983), or simply to avoid losses (Kennedy and Fiss 2009).  
The manner in which practices evolve as they diffuse has been characterized as 
adaptation along two dimensions, either of which may change as practices evolve (Ansari, 
Fiss, and Zajac 2010). First, Ansari et al. (2010) describe fidelity as measuring how truly 
the adopted version of the practice reflects the intended scope and meaning. This construct, 
alternatively been termed accuracy (Yuan et al. 2005), is not intentionally normative, in 
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that it does not reference an ideal cannon for adoption, but only distinctions compared to 
other adoption (Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac 2010). In this sense, a prototype for adoption by an 
early adopter is not the “ideal,” but does provide a useful reference point for comparison 
(Lewis and Seibold 1993). Second, extensiveness is the extent to which a practice is 
implemented on adoption (Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac 2010). By some termed intensity (Wu, 
Mahajan, and Balasubramanian 2003) or depth (Corbett and Muthulingam 2007, Westphal, 
Gulati, and Shortell 1997) of adoption, this dimension characterizes how “far-reaching” 
the implementation effort becomes (Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac 2010).  
These dimensions of practice adaptation have been depicted as orthogonal 
characteristics of a two-by-two matrix, with a variety of propositions noting conditions 
under which certain shifts may be expected (Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac 2010). By comparison, 
little of the literature assessing outcomes of voluntary programs, labelling, and certification 
acknowledges adaptation except as a limitation (Matisoff, Noonan, and Flowers 2016), and 
literature on signaling assumes practices do not evolve unless to undermine the signal 
(Stiglitz 2000). Yet, as shown in the following, the constructs presented in adaptation can 
be readily mapped to our understanding of signaling, disclosure, and clubs. In doing so, 
previously disjointed constructs are synthesized into two-space, for a framework for 
understanding noisy signals that draws heavily on theory of organizations. 
 
3.3 Constructing A Framework for Noisy Signals 
A straightforward application of the Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac (2010) depiction of adaptation 
is to relate each dimension to variance in green qualities adopted for signaling. 
Organizations making quality improvements for any reason face two broad choices: what 
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type of improvements to make, and how many improvements to make. The more variance 
in this, the more noisy a subsequent signal may be. When implementing a practice already 
adopted by others, organizations often try to follow best practices, replicating the success 
of lead adopters. Replication can also result in mimicry of some prototypical form, which 
may not be the easiest nor the most effective (Baron, Hannan, and Burton 1999, DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983).  
For example, early adopters face uncertainty about the best way to gain 
certification. To avoid the risk of being denied certification and losing the opportunity to 
signal, early adopter ensure that sufficient quality can be demonstrated by making 
additional improvements beyond the required level. Though later adopters have more 
information and have less need for these buffer points, they may mimic this practice, 
faithfully replicating the buffer between the required quality and the quality adopted. That 
organizations vary in the amount of quality buffering reduces signal fit (Karamanos 2003). 
However, it is not clear what the appropriate (normative) level should be: while some 
would argue that the quality should exactly match the requirement in order to derive the 
greatest signaling benefits, others would see the program as more effective if quality was 
as high as possible among adopters (Corbett and Muthulingam 2007).  
Ultimately, the degree to which organizations obtain excess quality to buffer 
against the risk of losing signaling benefits is not a normative measure, as there is no 
objective “best” level of quality relative to the signaling requirements. As a measure of 
fidelity, the excess quality buffer simply identifies relative differences in adoption. In the 
context of green signaling, this measure is closely linked to the degree of environmental 
disclosure. Where the signal sent closely resembles the actual product quality (minimal 
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quality buffering), disclosure is high. At one extreme, those with a great deal of buffering 
wind up under-disclosing their environmental qualities, in what has sometimes been termed 
“brownwash” (Kim and Lyon 2015). At the opposite extreme, some may use signals to 
over-state their actual quality, “greenwashing” their way to a signal. Effective enforcement 
may limit this, though it’s conceivable that those who have obtained the minimum quality 
for certification are more likely to be greenwashing (Delmas and Burbano 2011). While 
past depictions of brown- and greenwashing have been highly normative (Delmas and 
Burbano 2011, Lyon and Montgomery 2015, Gehman and Grimes 2016), we here depict 
these only as extreme cases along a spectrum of disclosure variance that helps measure the 
fidelity of practice adaptation.  
Measures of relative extensiveness distinguish the opposing axis describing 
practice adaptation. In the case of signaling, extensiveness may refer to the types of 
qualities obtained. Some qualities can be experienced by the user, consistent with the 
traditional expectations on signaling (Lee 2001). Other qualities are often considered 
desirable but provide public benefits that cannot be directly experienced by the user 
(Kotchen 2006). These public benefits are often promoted by green signaling mechanisms, 
which confer elite (club) status to those willing to provide them (Potoski and Prakash 
2009). The club theory perspective rewards public good provision with a shared elite 
identity (Potoski and Prakash 2009), which deviates from the signaling theory view that 
rewards private quality with private premiums (Spence 1973, Lee 2001).  
In pure forms, signaling theory and club theory refer only to purely private or purely 
public benefits. In the case of green signals, many programs promote a mix of public and 
private benefits, consistent with the notion of (bundled) impure public goods (Kotchen 
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2013). Green labels are often obtained through a mix of both. Again, we do not suggest a 
normative level of either public or private benefits that should be adopted by signalers, 
particularly because the ideal form that sustainability takes is not well established (Norton 
2015). Rather, we take purely public and purely private practices as the extremes along a 
spectrum of adoption extensiveness. Together with measures of fidelity, these describe a 
rough depiction of the variance in green signals. Though most adopters fall in the middle 
in terms of disclosure and public good provision, the extreme highs and lows may be 
marked by canonical signal types, depicted in Figure 1. 
In this characterization, we see traditional Spence-style signals as imperfectly 
disclosing privately experienced qualities, with Club-style signals fully disclosing public 
good provision. Where information about the public goods bundled to a product is under-
disclosed, we observe brownwashing. Greenwashing is here taken as the final quadrant; 
the term here indicates that the qualities disclosed may have been overstated (Kim and 
Lyon 2015). However, this articulation is somewhat contrived, due to the ambiguity in 
definitions of greenwash (Lyon and Maxwell 2011).  
An alternative set of quadrant labels might depict greenwash as the result of organizations 
labeling business-as-usual practices, rather than making improvements to gain signaling 
benefits (Lyon and Montgomery 2015). In this case, the term applies to the region currently 
occupied by the Spence-type signal. Further, the traditional perspective on signaling does 
not specify whether disclosure is complete (Spence 1973) or simply sufficient enough to 
induce the separating equilibrium (Akerlof 1970). If the former, the Spence-type signal 
occupies the region previously labelled greenwash. The ambiguous distinction between 
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these quadrants limits interpretability, arises from theoretically indistinct constructs, and 








However, nothing requires fidelity and extensiveness to exist as orthogonal 
dimensions. Statistically, it seems viable that, lacking a strict upper limit on total quality, 
any incremental improvements may impact both dimensions (ie, the dimensions are not 
independent). This is the case for complex goals like sustainability, a quality that may never 
be completely attained, but may be incrementally worked toward (Norton 2015). Nor 
should a graphical depiction require orthogonal angles, as alternative mappings are 
possible. Relaxing orthogonality in our graphical framework for noisy signals, we are able 
to synthesize a framework that is theoretically consistent with practical demands of 
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measuring sustainability. This is demonstrated in Figure 2, which transitions the 
dimensions of practice adaptation into a polar grid. In this characterization, changes in one 
dimension exaggerate changes in the other.  
 
Figure 3.2. A Framework for Noisy Signals. Outer boundaries are defined by 
the range of available signaling strategies. 
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In this framework, a signal’s position in two-space is determined by a radius and 
degree. The origin may be interpreted as a traditional signal of performance quality similar 
to descriptions asserted by Spence (1973). As the radius from the origin increases, we 
encounter signals that are generated by organizations going out of the way to provide public 
benefits for elite status. This allows the outer regions of the graph to describe outlier 
organizations that have chosen high levels of investment in public good, compared to 
center-of-the-road approaches that more traditionally rely on performance improvements 
for signaling. The degree of disclosure is then depicted within the framework as a literal 
degree of rotation around the two-space. Greenwashers, who have overstated their 
environmental quality, rotate upwards on the graph, while brownwashers, who 
underdisclose, rotate downward. This allows us to imagine the framework as an analog 
tuner depicting deliberate practice adaptation for fine-tuned signals of green quality. 
So, we arrive at an apt description of how green certification practices are adapted, 
which synthesizes much of the current discussion about environmental labelling as 
signaling, greenwash, brownwash, and clubs. Such a framework is of little use if it cannot 
advance our understanding of green labelling and corporate social responsibility. Further, 
it must sort the signaling from the noise: is positioning within this framework the result of 
strategic adaptation, and is that strategy intended to create noise that crowds out reliable 
quality signals, or is it intended to tune in to tailored needs? We investigate these questions 
by analyzing data on LEED building certification pathways. 
To apply this framework, the constructs of fidelity and extensiveness must first be 
made measureable. For analysis of LEED building certification pathways, we offer one 
way to do this. For other signaling mechanisms, alternative measures might be constructed. 
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Second, extensiveness and fidelity must be predictable. We offer prediction through 
stakeholder theory; we leave direct tests of other hypotheses from propositions based on 
institutional sociology (Zajac) to later work. In doing so, we demonstrate that positioning 
of signals within the framework is strategic, rather than random. Third, the extent to which 
strategic positioning enhances or undermines the effectiveness of the signal must be tested.  
 
3.4 Signaling in the Built Environment 
The US Green Building Council (USGBC) emerged from a network of stakeholders 
interested in promoting greener and more socially responsible practices in the built 
environment (cite web). Its Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) 
certification program was launched at the turn of the millennium, with the goal of 
correcting market failures, namely externalities and information asymmetries (Matisoff, 
Noonan, and Flowers 2016). The certification acts as a market signal of building quality, 
has diffused broadly (Kok, McGraw, and Quigley 2011, Kok and Holtermans 2014a), and 
has been associated with premiums such as improved rental and sales premiums (Eichholtz, 
Kok, and Quigley 2010a, Deng, Li, and Quigley 2012).  
 To obtain LEED certification, builders must make and verify improvements to their 
building, going beyond business-as-usual technology and design to mitigate environmental 
footprints of the building. Final certification is tiered, with each tier corresponding to a 
score or credit total built up from each improvement. To earn credits, builders choose from 
a flexible menu of improvements to the building’s energy, water, material, indoor quality, 
site selection, and innovative practices. This holistic approach includes some credits which 
confer private benefits (such as energy efficiency), whereas others do not (such as habitat 
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protection). Environmental performance of LEED buildings increases with each additional 
credit earned, but the signaling benefits of LEED only accrue as builder’s reach a higher 
tier of certification (Matisoff, Noonan, and Mazzolini 2014).  
 In evaluation literature, programs and certification systems are typically treated as 
homogeneous black-boxes. By opening this black box, we can observe the heterogeneity 
in how certifications are adopted, or rather, adapted. In doing so, we can apply the 
framework for noisy signals to LEED certification pathways. A dataset of approximately 
eight thousand certified buildings over a decade was made available by the USGBC for the 
purposes of this study. The data describe building characteristics (location, size, primary 
use), owner characteristics (market sector), and certification information (LEED credits 
adopted, score and tier, time of certification, and time of declaration of interest in 
certification). The dataset constitutes all buildings labeled within the same (new 
construction version 2.2) certification system during the study period. 
3.4.1 Measuring Fidelity  
The tiered structure of LEED has induced a saw-tooth distribution of LEED scores, 
as many adopt certification for marketing benefits (Matisoff, Noonan, and Mazzolini 
2014). Those certifying just at or just above are more likely to be motivated by marketing 
benefits of certification, seeking signaling benefits. By comparison, those certifying well 
above a threshold are more likely to be motivated by environmental performance 
motivations (Corbett and Muthulingam 2007, Matisoff, Noonan, and Mazzolini 2014). At 
the upper ranges of a LEED tier, builders still signal the same quality as those at the bottom 
of the tier. This creates an under-disclosure of environmental quality, or brownwash. By 
comparison, those motivated by marketing benefits are more likely to have overstated their 
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environmental performance, in a greenwash (over-disclosure). We may thus measure 
fidelity as the number of points by which a project exceed the requirement for LEED 
certification at the project’s tier. Conversations with industry experts note that, by default, 
an organization seeking LEED certification will apply for two or three points beyond their 
goal, to hedge against potential mistakes. We therefore measure 2.5 points above each 
threshold as the normal degree of disclosure (zero), with adjustments up or down from 
there. However, any prototypical reference point is useful only as comparison, not as a 
normative assumption (Lewis and Seibold 1993). Further, the reference point is fairly 
arbitrary when cast as an angle in a circle with a beginning determined only by convention. 
A key assumption, that overshooting a threshold is linearly related with the potential 
marketing or performance benefits of certification, is later relaxed.  
3.4.2 Measuring Extensiveness  
A naïve measure of extensiveness would simply be the number of LEED points 
obtained. However, the program has an explicit goal of encouraging social responsibility 
so that the public benefits alongside the building owners and occupants. Thus extensiveness 
is better measured as the public goods provided. All LEED credits confer at least some 
public benefit by mitigating environmental externalities. Some also cut operational costs, 
such as energy and water efficiency. Others improve occupant experience, such as indoor 
air quality and neighborhood walkability. Those which do not confer either type of private 
benefit are delineated from those that do, as depicted and justified in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 3.3. Achievement of LEED Points associated with potential private returns 
versus purely public benefits, as a percentage of total LEED score. 
 
 
Most LEED scores could be obtained with few credits that offer purely public 
benefits, if builders maximized efficiency before providing public goods. With this 
measure, we more directly observe how far out of the way builders go to provide public 
benefits while seeking certification, consistent with our mapping of public good provision 
as the radius in our signaling framework. On average, builders do appear to adopt a mix of 
both at all LEED scores, as observed in Figure 3. 
 
3.5 Predicting Fine-Tuned Signals 
Having demonstrated that the framework introduced provides observable measures of 
fidelity and extensiveness in an application to LEED certified buildings, the next task is to 
demonstrate the usefulness of the framework in establishing and testing hypotheses. If 
practices vary in how they are adopted, quality signals are considered noisy (Stiglitz 2000), 
	 65 
but this means little if the noise is random relative to expected patterns in motivations and 
outcomes to adopt. The framework presented is agnostic about these predictions, creating 
room to apply any number of theories to it. At its most useful, this framework can be used 
to describe noisy signals as the outcomes of differential motivations to adopt a practice, 
and can provide independent variables for understanding the outcomes of noisy signals. 
We begin from the former, leaving the latter to later work.  
 Can the positioning of signals within this framework be predicted from existing 
theory? In answer to this question, we may draw on numerous theories to generate 
hypotheses and demonstrate that the noisy adaptation of LEED certification is rational and 
strategically motivated. Hypotheses regarding fidelity are first drawn based on 
expectations for how market structure influences pressures to differentiate products with 
signaling. Second, hypotheses regarding extensiveness are drawn from stakeholder theory. 
Other work may more formally investigate the predictive capacity of the framework from 
information disclosure (Lyon and Shimshack 2015, Gehman and Grimes 2016), public 
good provision (Kotchen 2006), altruism (Andreoni 1990), and institutional statements 
(Crawford and Ostrom 1995), among others. 
 In the private sector, densely populated industries in nearly-pure competition are 
prone to quality differentiation (Hotelling 1929). Commercial office buildings stand to gain 
marketing premia for green certification (Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley 2010a), particularly 
if they are among the first locally to differentiate with the green label (Chegut, Eichholtz, 
and Kok 2011). Hospitals and other healthcare facilities practice quality differentiation 
despite sparse industry populations, largely due to limitations or regulations on price that 
limit alternative differentiation (Noether 1988). Industries subject to greater public scrutiny 
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and regulation are more practiced in publicly demonstrating changes for compliance, and 
may even develop a sense of duty after the responsibility of compliance is clearly 
established (May 2005). Firms experienced with regulators are also motivated to leverage 
voluntary action to avoid future regulation or legal entrenchment (Maxwell, Lyon, and 
Hackett 2000), as has been the case for green hotels (Priego et al. 2011). These industries 
are especially  likely to cluster just above thresholds,. 
Hypothesis 1: Industries facing greater quality differentiation pressures will maximize 
disclosure, certifying green with fewer buffer points (decreased fidelity). These industries 
include commercial office space, healthcare facilities, and hotels.  
 When choosing the quality improvements to make, firms may consider the 
stakeholders interested in green certification. Improvements that improve user experience 
are appealing to potential buyers and tenants, but are not necessarily salient to broader 
stakeholder classes (Demsetz 1970). As public organizations face more groups of external 
stakeholders and conflicting environmental demands (Antonsen and Jorgensen 1997), we 
expect public organizations to deviate in signaling strategy compared to private 
organizations (Meier and O'Toole Jr 2011), preferring public good provision.  
Hypothesis 2: For-profit firms will have a greater share of credits with private benefits 
(decreased extensiveness), compared to public organizations.  
In this hypothesis, we anticipate that commercial office buildings, hotels, heavy 
industry, and residential homes will follow a more traditional signaling strategy that 
confers private benefits. On the other hand, governments, nonprofits, schools, and civic 
groups will provide more public goods when certifying. By considering these dimensions 
separately, we can begin to predict the overall adaptation of LEED certification pathways 
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to different market sectors and industries. Separate regression models are constructed to 
predict certification pathway characteristics. Building ownership and building use serve as 
key independent variables, with controls for building size. Descriptive statistics for each 
characteristic appear in Table 1. After testing hypotheses, we can map the significant 
results into the framework, presenting the scatter of signals as the result of fine-tuning, 
rather than noise. Significant differences in the distribution of certification adaptations 
across building types can be leveraged to demonstrate the strategic positioning of signals 
within this framework.  
 
 
Table 3.1.  Descriptive statistics. Mean characteristics by select project types. Standard 
deviations listed in parentheses. Extensiveness is a function of public goods, as opposed 
to private goods (qualities experienced by users or through cost-savings). 






saving Fidelity Size* 
All 2,981 38.37 8.67 10.00 16.35 -2.07 113.08 
  (6.47) (2.19) (2.03) (4.23) (2.00) (250.40) 
Gov 1,694 38.67 8.77 9.92 16.58 -2.14 81.88 
  (5.96) (2.10) (1.97) (4.05) (2.01) (168.57) 
Firm 554 37.22 8.29 9.81 15.83 -1.93 222.55 
  (7.03) (2.38) (2.15) (4.40) (1.94) (417.47) 
Non-Profit  496 38.83 8.77 10.37 16.35 -2.10 96.92 
  (7.30) (2.29) (2.03) (4.63) (1.99) (145.00) 
Other owner 237 37.92 8.54 10.22 15.88 -1.92 114.02 
  (6.39) (2.10) (2.09) (4.19) (1.92) (315.80) 
School 653 38.77 8.94 10.26 16.22 -2.02 79.99 
  (6.40) (2.16) (2.00) (4.27) (2.07) (81.99) 
Industry 110 38.03 8.35 9.04 17.08 -2.41 206.68 
  (6.21) (2.14) (1.95) (4.36) (2.21) (378.84) 
Home 170 38.13 8.21 10.55 16.33 -2.05 271.46 
  (7.46) (2.15) (1.90) (4.74) (1.96) (549.49) 
Store 653 38.96 8.78 10.24 16.50 -2.16 124.61 
  (7.02) (2.36) (2.05) (4.28) (2.05) (233.94) 
Healthcare 164 36.55 8.78 10.05 14.53 -1.80 193.36 
  (5.79) (2.09) (1.85) (3.63) (1.67) (421.09) 
Hotel 66 36.75 7.92 10.39 15.36 -1.44 272.99 
  (6.69) (2.42) (2.27) (3.86) (1.63) (381.70) 
*Reported in 1,000’s gross square feet. In analysis, ln(Size) is used.  
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Table 3.2. OLS Regression Models of building qualities and signaling characteristics. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; year fixed effects included. 
Model (1) (2) 
Variables Extensiveness Fidelity 
Ln(Size) 0.274 *** -0.044 ** 
 (0.041)  (0.020) 
Education 0.244 * -0.078 
 (0.129)  (0.143) 
Industrial -0.168  0.599 
 (0.339)  (0.380) 
Residential -0.584 *** -0.204 
 (0.180)  (0.236) 
Commercial 0.204  0.120 
 (0.136)  (0.138) 
Healthcare 0.129  -0.295 ** 
 (0.187)  (0.145) 
Hospitality -0.911 *** -0.630 ** 
 (0.259)  (0.266) 
Government 0.341 ** 0.139 
 (0.147)  (0.154) 
For-Profit owner -0.256  -0.134 
 (0.175)  (0.173) 
Non-Profit owner 0.216  0.115 
 (0.179)  (0.136) 
Constant 5.338 *** 2.496 *** 
 (0.490)  (0.277) 
No. obs. 2,822  2,822 
R-squared 0.048  0.012 




Regression results indicate differences between building type and signaling 
strategy. Table 2 contains results from models describing how ownership and end use drive 
the fidelity and extensiveness of certification adaptation. The first model describes 
certification fidelity in terms of the number of points obtained beyond a required threshold. 
Projects with less fidelity overshoot thresholds by less. The hospitality and healthcare 
industries are far less likely to achieve beyond minimum certification requirements. While 
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larger buildings also have a tendency towards reduced fidelity, we do not observe any 
statistically significant differences between ownership types for this dimension of our 
typology. 
Statistically significant results from the second model indicate that government-
owned and educational facilities tend to adopt more extensively, producing more public 
goods compared to other projects. Residential and hospitality facilities certify more 
through private benefits. As building size increases, so do the public goods associated with 
project certification, as a percent of total credits obtained in the certification strategy. 
With measures of fidelity and extensiveness for each building, we can map the data 
into the framework. This is depicted in Figure 4, which contains separate panels for the 
overall scatter of all data, a heat map reflecting the density of observations in each region 
of the framework, and a characterization of building types typically found in each region 
of the framework. Because the definitions for brown- and greenwashing are debated 
somewhat, the boundary conditions of each region are not strictly specified on the graph. 
However, when we observe a type of building to have a significantly different 
characteristic compared to the population, we can plot it in the appropriate region.  
Typically, statistically differences in characteristics are described in a single 
dimension (as in Chapter 2). To demonstrate that the populations of each region of the 
graph systematically vary with regard to ownership or building use, a joint test of statistical 
differences is needed. To do this, the frequency with which certain types of observations 
fall near the extremes of the dataset is counted. Table 3 provides a summary of these counts 
for owner type, which are roughly consistent with hypotheses (e.g., governments adopt 







(b) Heat Map (c) Building Types 
 
Figure 3.4. Populated Framework for Noisy Signals. Panel (a) depicts the overall 
scatter of adaptations across the population, (b) shows the density of observations as a 
heat map, with red regions containing the highest density, and (c) notes where certain 
types of buildings are likely to be found within the framework. Note that, in the LEED 
certification system, greenwash is limited by monitoring and enforcement. 
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confirms that the difference in ownership composition across the typology is statistically 
significant. With nine degrees of freedom, the chi-squared statistic is 39.16, significant at 




Table 3.3. How Existing Buildings Fit into the Framework. The percentage of 
observations belonging to each ownership category is presented for each signaling type. 
Totals represent the counts of each owner and signaling type. 
 Owner Type  
Signal 







Club  60.12 16.26 16.41 7.21 652 
Spence  52.41 20.96 17.85 8.78 706 
Greenwash 57.10 19.85 17.10 5.95 655 
Brownwash 64.69 11.73 15.31 8.27 810 
Totals 1,660 479 469 215 2,823 
 
 
Thus, the distribution of owners within the signaling framework is not random, and 
we interpret this as one sign that certification is strategically adapted. A traditional, Spence 
model of market signals would interpret this variance as noisy signals crowding out the 
intended quality information and eroding any separating equilibrium induced by the label. 
Under this framework developed here, such “noise” can rather be understood as 
organizations adapting a signal, tuning it to their particular needs. 
 
 
3.6 Summary and Discussion 
Under the framework developed for noisy signals, green labelling can be understood as 
adaptable to specific needs, and, as shown, offers predictive power when integrated with 
theoretical perspectives. It is not asserted that this framework is a theory in its own right, 
but rather, provides a useful means of integrating existing perspectives from disparate 
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literatures. Notably, analysis drawing on this framework depends on proper measurement 
of extensiveness and fidelity. Future work must reexamine the relationship between the 
constructs and their measurements, in order to relax the assumptions surrounding the 
models specified above. Specifically, there may not be a linear relationship between a 
preference for marketing benefits and the number of additional credits adopted beyond a 
required threshold. And, the stability of the ratio of public goods provided and private 
goods procured may in fact vary as practices evolve. With improved measures of these two 
dimensions, we can further assess the framework developed.  
 The developed measures of fidelity and extensiveness are not unique to the green 
building industry. Labeling programs usually require participants to surpass some 
threshold for quality to get certification and its signaling benefits. This means signals 
accrue discontinuously, though they are based on continuous quality indicators. Though 
many are binary quality indicators, such as board certification and teacher quality 
(Goldhaber and Anthony 2007), others share LEED’s tiered structure, including bond and 
credit ratings, restaurant ratings, and numerous multitier ecolabels (Fischer and Lyon 2013, 
Farhi, Lerner, and Tirole 2013).  
 The hypotheses presented determine variance in LEED certification pathways as 
organizations signal specifically to priority stakeholders. Additional hypotheses may be 
drawn from perspectives on disclosure and club theory, among others. And, the framework 
can be used to compare signal variance across competing label designs. Alternatively the 
framework can provide independent variables to predict the effectiveness of signals at 
conferring market premiums. Under traditional perspectives on signaling, only signals at 
the origin of the depicted framework hold value in the market: that is, public goods that go 
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unexperienced or unobserved by the user obscure consumer understanding of overall 
quality as it relates to the signal (Lee 2001, Stiglitz 2000). But, if signals created by 
generating public or credence goods confer the same (or better) market premiums, a case 
exists for noisy signals as a strategic tool that does not undermine the effectiveness of the 
signaling mechanism.  
Some research on environmental labelling has found positive financial performance 
impacts, while others observe no impact or even a negative impact, with a fair amount of 
debate circling the cause (Koehler 2007). The extent to which noisy signals influence this 
premium ambiguity warrants consideration. However, with some general evidence that 
LEED certified buildings do obtain financial premiums, we are poised to assess how 
certification practices evolve as they diffuse over time. 
 
3.7 References 
Akerlof, George A. 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism."  The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3):488-500. 
 
Andreoni, James. 1990. "Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of 
warm-glow giving."  The economic journal 100 (401):464-477. 
 
Ansari, Shahzad M., Peer Christian Fiss, and Edward J. Zajac. 2010. "MADE TO FIT: 
HOW PRACTICES VARY AS THEY DIFFUSE."  Academy of management 
review 35 (1):67-92. 
 
Antonsen, Marianne, and Torben Beck Jorgensen. 1997. "The 'Publicness' of Public 
Organizations."  Public Administration 75:337-357. 
 
Asensio, Omar Isaac, and Magali A. Delmas. 2017. "The effectiveness of US energy 
e-ffiency building labels."  Nature Energy 2:1-8. doi: 
doi:10.1038/nenergy.2017.33. 
 
Baron, J.N., M.T. Hannan, and M.D. Burton. 1999. "Building the Iron Cage: 
Determinants of Managerial Intensity in the Early Years of Organizations."  
American Sociological Review 64:527-547. 
	 74 
 
Bernstein, Steven, and Benjamin Cashore. 2007. "Can non-state global governance be 
legitimate? An analytical framework."  Regulation & Governance 1 (4):1-25. 
 
Boss, Frank M. 1980. "The Relationship Between Diffusion Rates, Experience Curves, 
and Demand Elasticities for Consumer Durable Technological Innovations."  The 
Journal of Business 53 (3, Part 2: Interfaces Between Marketing and 
Economics):S51-S67. 
 
Bromley, P., and W. W. Powell. 2012. "From smoke and mirrors to walking the talk: 
Decoupling in the contemporary world."  Academy of Management Annals 6:483-
530. 
 
Cantono, Simona, and Gerald Silverberg. 2009. "A percolation model of eco-innovation 
diffusion: The relationship between diffusion, learning economies and subsidies."  
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 76:487-496. doi: 
10.1016/j.techfore.2008.04.010. 
 
Chegut, Andrea, Piet Eichholtz, and Nils Kok. 2011. 
 
Corbett, Charles J., and Suresh Muthulingam. 2007. 
 
Crawford, Sue E. S., and Elinor Ostrom. 1995. "The Grammar of Institutions."  American 
Political Science REview 89 (3):582-600. 
 
Darnall, Nicole. 2016. "The Institutional Design of Ecolabels: Sponsorship Signals and 
Rule Strength."  Regulation & Governance. 
 
Darnall, Nicole, and Joann Carmin. 2005. "Greener and Cleaner? The Signaling 
Accuracy of U.S. Voluntary Environmental Programs."  Policy Sciences 38:71-
90. 
 
Darnall, Nicole, Matthew Potoski, and Aseem Prakash. 2009. "Sponsorship Matters: 
Assessing Business Participation in Government- and Industry-Sponsored 
Voluntary Environmental Programs."  Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory 20 (3):283-307. 
 
Delmas, Magali A., and Maria J. Montes-Sancho. 2010. "Voluntary agreements to 
improve environmental quality: symbolic and substantive cooperation."  Strategic 
Management Journal:575-601. doi: 10.1002/smj.826. 
 
Delmas, Magali, and Vanessa Cuerel Burbano. 2011. "The Drivers of Greenwashing."  
CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 54 (1):64-87. 
 
Demsetz, Harold. 1970. "The private production of public goods."  The Journal of Law & 
Economics 13 (2):293-306. 
	 75 
 
Deng, Y., Z. Li, and J. M. Quigley. 2012. "Economic returns to energy-efficient 
investments in the housing market: evidence from Singapore."  Regional Science 
and Urban Economics 42:506–515. 
 
DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1983. "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields."  American 
Sociological Review 48 (2):147-160. 
 
Eichholtz, P., N. Kok, and E. Yonder. 2012. "Portfolio greenness and the financial 
performance of REITs."  Journal of International Money and Finance 31:1911–
1929. 
 
Eichholtz, Piet, Nils Kok, and John M. Quigley. 2010. "Doing Well by Doing Good? 
Green Office Buildings."  American Economic Review 100 (5):2492-2509. doi: 
10.1257/aer.100.5.2492. 
 
Farhi, Emmanuel, Josh Lerner, and Jean Tirole. 2013. "Fear of rejection? Tiered 
certification and transparency."  The RAND Journal of Economics 44 (4):610-631. 
 
Fischer, Carolyn, and Thomas P. Lyon. 2013. Ann Arbor. 
 
Flammer, Caroline. 2013. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder Reaction: 
The Environmental Awareness of Investors."  Academy of Management Journal 
56 (3):758-781. 
 
Flammer, Caroline. 2015. "Does Corporate Social Responsibility Lead to Superior 
Financial Performance? A Regression Discontinuity Approach."  Management 
Science 61 (11):2549-2568. 
 
Gehman, Joel, and Matthew Grimes. 2016. "Hidden badge of honor: how contextual 
distinctiveness affects category promotion among certified B corporations."  
Academy of Management Journal. doi: 10.5465/amj.2015.0416. 
 
Goldhaber, Dan, and Emily Anthony. 2007. "Can teacher quality be effectively assessed? 
National board certification as a signal of effective teaching."  The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 89 (1):134-150. 
 
Hotelling, H. 1929. "Stability in Competition."  Economic Journal 39 (1):41-57. 
 
Ji, Hyunjung, and Nicole Darnall. 2017. "All are not created equal: assessing local 
governments' strategic approaches toward sustainability."  Public Management 
Review Forthcoming. 
 
Karamanos, A. G. 2003. "Complexity, Identity and the Value of Knowledge Intensive 
Exchanges."  Journal of Management Studies 40 (7):1871-1890. 
	 76 
 
Kats, G. H. . 2003. Green building costs and financial benefits. Cambridge, MA: 
Massachusetts Technology Collaborative. 
 
Kennedy, Mark Thomas, and Peer Christian Fiss. 2009. "Institutionalization, Framing, 
and Diffusion: The Logic of TQM Adoption and Implementation Decisions 
Among U.S. Hospitals."  Academy of Management Journal 52 (5):897-918. 
 
Kim, Eun-Hee, and Thomas P. Lyon. 2015. "Greenwash vs. Brownwash: Exaggeration 
and Undue Modesty in Corporate Sustainability Disclosure."  Organization 
Science 26 (3):705-723. 
 
King, A., and M. Toffel. 2009. "Self-regulatory institutions for solving environmental 
problems: Perspectives and contributions from the management literature." In 
Governance for the environment: New perspectives, edited by M. Delmas & O. 
Young. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Koehler, Dinah A. 2007. "The Effectiveness of Voluntary Environmental Programs -- A 
Policy at a Crossroads?"  The Policy Studies Journal 35 (4):689-722. 
 
Kok, N., and R. Holtermans. 2014. National green building adoption index 2014. Los 
Angeles: CBRE. 
 
Kok, Nils, Marquise McGraw, and John M. Quigley. 2011. "The Diffusion of Energy 
Efficiency in Building."  American Economic Review 101 (3):77-82. doi: 
10.1257/aer.101.3.77. 
 
Kotchen, Matthew J. 2006. "Green markets and private provisions of public goods."  
Journal of Political Economy 114:816-34. 
 
Kotchen, Matthew J. 2013. "Voluntary- and Information-Based Approaches to 
Environmental Management: A Public Economics Perspective."  Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy 7 (2):276-295. 
 
Lee, P. M. 2001. "What's in a name. com?: The effects of ‘. com’name changes on stock 
prices and trading activity."  Strategic Management Journal 22 (8):793-804. 
 
Lewis, L. K., and D. R. Seibold. 1993. "Innovation modification during 
intraorganizational adoption."  Academy of Management Journal 18:322–354. 
 
Lyon, Thomas P., and John W. Maxwell. 2011. "Greenwash: Corporate environmental 
disclosure under threat of audit."  Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 
20 (1):3-41. 
 
Lyon, Thomas P., and A. Wren Montgomery. 2015. "The Means and End of Greenwash."  
Organization & Environment 28 (2):223-249. 
	 77 
 
Lyon, Thomas P., and Jay P. Shimshack. 2015. "Environmental Disclosure: Evidence 
from Newsweek's Green Companies Rankings."  Business & Society 54 (5):632-
675. 
 
Matisoff, Daniel C., Douglas S. Noonan, and Mallory E. Flowers. 2016. "Green 
Buildings: Economics and Policies."  Review of Environmental Economics and 
Policy 10 (2):329-346. 
 
Matisoff, Daniel C., Douglas S. Noonan, and Anna M. Mazzolini. 2014. "Performance or 
Marketing Benefits? The Case of LEED Certification."  Environmental Science & 
Technology 48 (3):2001-2007. 
 
Maxwell, John W., Thomas P. Lyon, and Steven C. Hackett. 2000. "Self-Regulation and 
Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism."  The 
Journal of Law and Economics 43 (2):583-618. 
 
May, Peter J. 2005. "Regulation and Compliance Motivations: Examining Different 
Approaches."  Public Administration Review 65 (1):31-44. 
 
Meier, Kenneth J., and Laurence J. O'Toole Jr. 2011. "Comparing public and private 
management: Theoretical expectations."  Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 21 (Publicness and Organizational Performance: A Special 
Issue):i283-i299. 
 
Noether, M. . 1988. "Competition Among Hospitals."  Journal of Health Economics 
7:259-284. 
 
Norton, Bryan G. . 2015. Sustainable values, sustainable change: a guide to 
environmental decision making: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Potoski, Matthew, and Aseem Prakash. 2009. "Voluntary Clubs: An Introduction." In 
Voluntary programs: A club theory perspective, edited by M. Potoski & A. 
Prakash. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
Priego, B, M Jesús, JJ Najera, and X Font. 2011. "Environmental management decision-
making in certified hotels."  Journal of Sustainable Tourism19(3): 361-381 19 
(3):361-381. 
 
Rogers, Everett M. 1976. "New Product Adoption and Diffusion."  Journal of Consumer 
Research 2 (4):290-301. 
 
Roy, Donald. 1952. "Quota Restriction and Goldbricking in a Machine Shop."  American 
Journal of Sociology 57 (5):427-442. 
 
	 78 
Ryan, Bryce, and Neal C. Gross. 1943. "The diffusion of hybrid seed corn in two Iowa 
communities."  Rural sociology 8 (1). 
 
Singh, A., M. Syal, S. C. Grady, and S. Korkmaz. 2010. "Effects of green buildings on 
employee health and productivity."  American Journal of Public Health 
100:1665–1668. 
 
Spence, M. 1973. "Job Market Signaling."  The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87 
(3):355-374. 
 
Stiglitz, J. E. 2000. "The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth 
Century Economics."  The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (4):1441-1478. 
 
Tolbert, P S, and L G Zucker. 1983. "Institutional sources of change in the formal 
structure of organizations: the diffusion of civil service reform, 1880 – 1935."  
Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1):22–39. 
 
Westphal, J.D., R. Gulati, and S.M. Shortell. 1997. "Customization or conformity? an 
institutional and network perspective on the content and consequences of TQM 
adoption."  Administrative Science Quarterly 42:366-394. 
 
Wu, F., V. Mahajan, and S. Balasubramanian. 2003. "An analysis of e-business adoption 
and its impact on business performance."  Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science 31:425–447. 
 
Yuan, Y. C., J. Fulk, M. Shumate, P. Monge, J. A. Bryant, and M Matsaganis. 2005. 
"Individual participation in organizational information commons: The impact of 
team level social influence and technology-specific competence."  Human 
Communication Research 31 (2):212–240. 
 
	 79 
CHAPTER 4: LEARNING TO LEED: A RACE TO THE TOP THROUGH 
SIGNALING 
 
As eco-labels certifications diffuse, it is often unclear whether recent adopters are more 
green compared to early adopters, or less. Where environmental regulation leads to shifting 
practices is often discussed as a “Race to the Bottom” or a “Race to the Top.” However, 
the theory of regulatory differentiation does not clearly answer how these races are 
distinguished, or what forms of regulation might induce a race. Opting for a different 
perspective based on information asymmetry as a market failure, this manuscript explores 
how participation in voluntary environmental certification changes over time. By doing so, 
we assert that information can catalyze a race in a variety of settings. Analyzing Leadership 
in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) building certification data, we introduce a 
methodology for distinguishing propensities to certify for signaling opportunities versus 
technology improvements. Data demonstrate that over time, organizations and especially 
firms invest additional resources to attain higher certification, with more attention to 
specific green attributes.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Voluntary programs and eco-labels are becoming increasingly popular (Darnall and 
Aragon-Correa 2014), as regulators promote greener practices and as firms seek to 
demonstrate social responsibility and sustainability. These soft-policy interventions 
encourage sustainability by distinguishing high quality firms and products, lowering 
information asymmetries between firms and consumers. In return for participation, 
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organizations hope to accrue market rents. The institutional design of voluntary and 
information-based approaches to sustainability varies immensely in terms of sponsor 
organization (Darnall, Potoski, and Prakash 2009), monitoring and enforcement (Potoski 
and Prakash 2009), and scope of behaviors governed. For example, the government-
sponsored Energy Star label addresses only the energy efficiency of a product, whereas 
green building labels from nongovernmental groups often address multiple product 
characteristics, like Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) and Green 
Globes. 
Participation in green labelling and voluntary environmental has received scholarly 
attention as researchers attempt to explain and predict the phenomenon. Much of this work 
examines environmental outcomes of participation in a voluntary environmental program 
(Koehler 2007). Evidence on the environmental performance of participant firms has been 
extremely variable, suggesting effective environmental reform from some programs but 
not others. To some extent, the mixed evidence may be the result of comparing evidence 
across cases, where free-riding and greenwashing are either limited or fostered by different 
program designs (Delmas and Keller 2005). Because studies of voluntary program 
performance are subject to numerous specification errors (Matisoff 2015), empirical 
methodology may explain other variation in contrary results from multiple studies of the 
same program. For example, studies of energy efficiency in green certified buildings have 
identified higher energy use among LEED buildings, suggesting a rebound effect 
(Newsham, Mancini, and Birt 2009a). Yet more recent analysis using advanced matching 
techniques reveals large energy savings related to LEED certification (Asensio and Delmas 
2017).  
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Additionally, some have asserted heterogeneous environmental outcomes arise 
from distinctions in early and late adopters. The fidelity with which participants implement 
practices they claim to adopt is often higher in early adoption by market leaders (Ansari, 
Fiss, and Zajac 2010). As a practice diffuses, latecomers responding to institutional 
pressures and seeking legitimacy, may be more likely to adopt a practice symbolically 
(Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2010). Facing market premiums or other rents associated with 
sustainability, late adopters have further incentive to adopt less substantively (Maxwell, 
Lyon, and Hackett 2000) creating signal noise that erodes the separating equilibrium 
induced by green signals (Akerlof 1970).  
Taken together, this theory and evidence suggests that voluntary and information-
based approaches to sustainability may not maintain their efficacy in the long-run. Yet 
organizations that sponsor green labels and certifications often claim to be drivers of 
market transformation. Green building industry professionals often assert that “LEED 
drove the demand for low-VOC paint,” referring to the rapid diffusion of green technology 
following the diffusion of the green building certification program.3 The now-
commonplace paints, which emit less volatile organic compounds (VOCs), were virtually 
unavailable in regular markets when LEED began counting the paint towards its 
certification (though a causal link has not been formally established). The claim that 
voluntary certification can foster extensive adoption over time stands in sharp contrast to 
work that notes diminished environmental performance of late adopters (Delmas and 
																																																						
3 For examples of reports citing this claim, see web resources such as Coatings World 
(http://www.coatingsworld.com/issues/0414/view_features/low--and-zero-voc-paint-
technology/7877), the USGBC website (https://www.usgbc.org/articles/leed-facts), or 
Chemical and Engineering News (http://cen.acs.org/sponsored-content/pushing-toward-
sustainability.html). 
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Montes-Sancho 2010, Toffel 2006). If true, the claim suggests that voluntary and 
information-based programs may drive a “Race to the Top” (RTT) in markets.  
Can a voluntary measure catalyze a Race to the Top? In this paper, we first discuss 
theoretical perspectives that suggest how the RTT may come about. The hypotheses that 
emerge from this discussion are tested using data on LEED certification pathways. To 
accommodate to LEEDs flexible and multi-tier certification structure, we develop a 
methodology for measuring the magnitude of shifts in distributions within and across tiers. 
The discussion concludes with implications for theory, methodology, and practice. 
 
4.2 Racing to the Top: A Critique of Theory 
Though the notion of a Race to the Top is common in rhetoric for political reform, 
and though it provides a framework for discussion in many longitudinal studies, the 
theoretical mechanism describing what drives a RTT is piecemeal. Most often, RTT is 
framed as simply the opposite of a Race to the Bottom (RTB). As we will discuss below, 
it is not clear how the theory inverts. After introducing the limits of the RTB, we turn to 
other perspectives to develop a more complete theory for the RTT.  
In its simplest form, RTB argues that when jurisdictions compete for industry, they 
must create favorable conditions for industry to thrive (Stewart 1977). If compliance with 
regulation is costly, the equilibrium policy will be established at the point of least 
intervention (Drezner 2001, 2007), potentially diminishing social welfare or establishing a 
“pollution haven.” However, jurisdictions may compete along more than one factor, 
differentiating their regulatory profiles in order to avoid a Race (Revesz 1992). Further 
challenging the RTB theory, benefits of regulation may outweigh the costs, and prompt 
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others to adopt stricter policy. This may be true where firms obtain private benefits from 
efficiency improvements associated with regulatory changes. Where social welfare 
increases noticeably as a result of regulation, a “California Effect,” may catalyze the 
adoption of more stringent policies. In the latter, the desirability of the cleaner environment 
noticeable after regulation appears to have catalyzed the diffusion of regulatory policies 
(Vogel 1995). 
 Empirical evidence of the RTB is perhaps even more uncertain, with numerous 
studies confirming and refuting it (Dong, Gong, and Zhao 2012). In an apparent response, 
recent literature has moved away from the emphasis on the regulatory differentiation 
mechanism, exploring alternative conditions that could drive the phenomenon. Tensions 
between competitive local markets and trade across global markets has been offered as a 
driver of firm behavior both toward and away from improved social responsibility (Mosley 
and Uno 2007). Specifically, Saikawa (2013) notes the propensity of export pressures to 
drive adoption of heightened standards for automobile emissions, even in developing 
countries. This observation counters some conventional intuition that globalization 
produces a RTB. However, it is not clear whether the observed trend is the result of a Race, 
or simply diffusion of best practices in policymaking. In a true race, regulations improve 
incrementally in all locations; by contrast diffusion is marked by the spread of a single 
policy. In this sense, the so-called “California effect,” is the result of policy diffusion, 
though it is often discussed as a Race (Vogel 1995).  
In addition to the drift in theory and mechanism, recent literature has pivoted with 
respect to the phenomenon of interest and units of analysis. Policy innovation has shifted 
governance practices from command-and-control type regulation toward market-based, 
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voluntary, and information-based mechanisms. Studies claiming a Race have begun 
addressing these non-regulatory interventions. For example, Prakash and Potoski (2006) 
note that voluntary regulations such as ISO 14001 are increasingly adopted in nations with 
high adoption in major export markets. Work by Bernstein and Cashore (2004, 2007) has 
emphasized the role of non-state actors, such as industry groups and nongovernmental 
organizations, as legitimate forms of governance that can drive shifts in behavior within an 
industry. Throughout their work on non-state market driven (NSMD) governance, forestry 
certification organizations are depicted as governors of their market jurisdiction, though 
their efficacy in this role is thought to be contingent on several contextual factors (Cashore 
2002). In competitive market conditions, NSMD governance suggests that learning can 
foster a RTT, at least in some institutional arrangements (Bernstein and Cashore 2007). 
 This drift in focus offers both a critique of the regulatory differentiation mechanism 
defining the RTB and RTT literature, and an opportunity to develop an improved 
theoretical framework. In the following, we eschew the regulatory differentiation 
mechanism in favor of an information-based catalyst for a Race that depends on learning, 
and is consistent with recent threads of research. Under this framework, a Race is possible 
under regulatory and non-regulatory policy approaches, can be fostered in political and 
market-based jurisdictions, and can be driven by government and non-state actors. 
Critically, we assert that this theory improves on the extant literature, by offering a 
logically consistent pathway to both the RTT and the RTB, while suggesting hypotheses 
that are both testable and falsifiable. 
 
4.3 On Signaling, Learning, and Racing 
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To synthesize a theory for Racing, we begin by asking why a Race is ever necessary. In 
well-behaved markets, rational actors behave according to well-behaved preferences in the 
presence of symmetric information. Policy interventions hoping to induce a RTT need only 
exist when markets fail; that is, when preferences are complete but cannot be acted upon 
due to information barriers.4 In effect, policies provide information signals to correct 
asymmetries and alleviate market failures. This provides consumers a means to act on their 
preferences, distinguishing high- from low-quality goods and firms (Akerlof 1970). This 
can induce quality competition in which firms to respond to the “green” consumers’ 
willingness to pay for more sustainable products by improving environmental quality 
(Lyon and Maxwell 2008).  
Quality competition is predicated on several foundational assumptions. First, a 
market must be competitive, with limited market power. Second, quality must be 
ascertainable to consumers; that is, consumers must receive and understand the information 
signaled by a firm’s reputation or a product’s label. Without these, firms are capable of 
exploiting labels, stagnating substantive shifts in behavior (Harrison 1999). Third, quality 
must confer value to the consumer: no Race occurs when consumers are indifferent to the 
distinguished quality pools. Fourth, information about quality comes from consistent 
signals, with signal noise from free-riders or greenwashers limited by monitoring (Delmas 
and Burbano 2011, Delmas and Keller 2005, Potoski and Prakash 2005a, 2009) and by the 
costliness of implementing and verifying enhanced quality (Mason 2012). Absent these, 
information is undermined as a tool for shifting behavior, as observed in studies revealing 
																																																						
4 Alternatively, the market failure could arise from irrational behavior, or from ill-behaved 
preferences. Because these are not the focus of existing policy interventions, set these 
possibilities aside by assuming rational behavior on stable preferences. However, we note 
that analysis under boundedly-rational conditions provide a potential arena for follow up 
research. 
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reduced performance in late adopters of a practice (Toffel 2006, Westphal, Gulati, and 
Shortell 1997, Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac 2010, Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2010, Kennedy 
and Fiss 2009, DiMaggio and Powell 1983). For clarity, the assumptions are summarized 
in Table 1. 
With information as a signal that helps firms obtain rent under quality competition, 
a Race to the Top proceeds as follows. As premiums incentivize higher quality, more firms 
adopt higher quality practices. With diffusion of these practices, experience accrues and 
organizations learn. Learning reduces costs (Cohen and Levinthal 1989), which make 
higher quality more feasible for more firms. As a result, even more firms adopt, and a cycle 
of learning is iterated that propagates a Race.  
 
Table 4.1. Assumptions of the Learning Mechanism for a Race. 
Assumption Significance Central Literature 
Rational behavior on 
well-behaved preferences 
 
Generally assumed Axioms of Choice 
Information is signaled, 
understood, and preferred 
 
Separating equilibrium 
leads to market premiums 
 




Limited market power Harrison (1999); Maxwell, 
Lyon and Hackett (2000) 
 
No free riding Costliness to obtain; 
Enforcement mechanism 
exists 
Mason (2012); Delmas and 
Burbano (2011); Delmas and 
Keller (2005); Potoski and 




This cycle propagates, potentially ad infinitum, yet with several caveats. First, 
diminishing returns to learning (Cohen and Levinthal 1989) may gradually slow the 
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observed Race, with quality asymptotically reaching an equilibrium quality level. Second, 
as a particular quality enhancement becomes market norm, the standards delineating high 




Figure 4.1. Dynamics of Signaling, Learning and Racing in a Competitive Market. 
Once information is introduced, firms exploit signaling opportunities, learning from 
quality improvements, and making other improvements more cost-effective. As more 
firms adopt, the information program must become more stringent, or a pooling 




Though the language regarding quality competition implies the upward trajectories 
of the RTT, we assert that this same mechanism points to the RTB. Breach of the 
assumptions can readily transform an information signal from inducing a RTT to a RTB. 
When market is concentrated within an industry, competition is inhibited (Harrison 1999). 
Yet firms may choose to exercise their market power to manipulate signals as a rent-
seeking strategy (Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett 2000). This is observed in industry-
sponsored legislation and labeling programs which carry little legitimacy (Bernstein and 
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Cashore 2004), confer lower returns (Darnall, Potoski, and Prakash 2009), but also 
generate signaling noise that prevents the RTT. In this setting, policy learning (Jenkins-
Smith and Sabatier 1993) helps rent seekers (free-riders or greenwashers) to exploit signals 
(Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett 2000) or influence policy processes to minimize regulations 
that would result in costly compliance (Dal Bó 2006). In this way, the learning perspective 
on the RTB is closely related to traditional perspectives, though derived from 
fundamentally distinct mechanism. For completeness, we note that markets also undergo 
the RTB for bads that consumers prefer not to obtain, though this is somewhat trivial. 
This theory is consistent with recent assertions that trade drives the RTT. More 
precisely, scholars have observed increased diffusion of higher quality practices when 
markets are networked through trade flows (Prakash and Potoski 2006, Saikawa 2013). 
Networks have been identified as facilitators of learning in a variety of markets (Desmarais, 
Harden, and Boehmke 2015, Egels-Zanden 2017, Krackhardt and Hanson 1993, Owen-
Smith and Powell 2004), absent extreme embeddedness (Uzzi 1997). Thus, we generally 
anticipate networks to catalyze the Race through learning.  
 From the above, we arrive at a new mechanism for a Race based on information 
signals and learning. Under this framework, we avoid theoretical hiccups of the regulatory 
differentiation perspective, particularly by providing a path to either the RTT or RTB via 
a single mechanism. The learning perspective is consistent with recent literature claiming 
the existence of a Race induced by non-regulatory mechanisms or non-state governance, 
and that the Race is fostered through networks. With this theoretical lens in place, we are 
now prepared to answer our original research question. That is, we can now identify tests 
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for the assertion that voluntary and information-based policy approaches can induce a RTT, 
based on the phenomena denoting a Race.  
In its reduced form, any Race is connotes diffusion of a set of practices. This has at 
times been the key observation from which a Race is (incorrectly) assumed. While certainly 
a Race is less compelling for policy purposes if it is not widespread, horizontal proliferation 
is not required for a Race to exist. In the case of markets with concentrated power, vertical 
proliferation among a few powerful firms can be equally influential in terms of the desired 
social outcome. Notably, we have asserted that this type of proliferation would seem to 
foster the RTB. By contrast, in the absence of highly concentrated market power, we 
anticipate that widespread diffusion is a central characteristic of a Race.  
Hypothesis 1. Where conditions for the RTT are met, information signals foster learning 
to accelerate widespread market adoption of a practice. 
Though diffusion is in ways a hallmark indicator for a Race, it is not in itself 
sufficient proof of Racing. To address this distinction, it is helpful to examine shifts in the 
extensive and fidelity of practice adoption over time (Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac 2010). In this 
conceptualization, extensiveness is the degree to which a practice is adopted, whether far-
reaching or restricted; fidelity is the degree to which the adopted form of the practice 
matches past iterations or original intent. As orthogonal dimensions of practice adoption, 
extensiveness and fidelity are treated separately in terms of a Race. This distinction varies 
from past treatments of Racing, in that previous literature rarely acknowledges 
heterogeneity of adoption, treating participants as uniform adopters. Because a RTT 
requires iterative gains in performance or quality, the RTT predicts extensiveness 
dimensions increasing over time.  
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Hypothesis 2. Where conditions for the RTT are met, information signals foster learning 
to accelerate increased extensiveness in practice adoption. 
Recalling that the RTB is possible when signaling is manipulated to accrue rents 
with deceptive information, it is important to distinguish the RTB from the RTT. We can 
do this by further leveraging the extensiveness and fidelity of diffusing practices. In the 
RTB, extensiveness is strictly non-increasing. This does not suggest that the RTB requires 
diminishing extensiveness, but that, if extensiveness is stable, the RTB could emerge from 
diminished fidelity. In some sense, diminishing extensiveness with diminishing fidelity 
may be the “strong” form of the RTB, in which practices worsen social outcomes in time. 
The “weak” version of the same requires only one dimension to diminish. The RTB may 
occur through stable extensiveness and low fidelity, observed as gaming signals through 
symbolic adoption, free-riding, or greenwashing. Or, the RTB may occur through stable 
fidelity and low extensiveness. This phenomenon has been called a “Race to the Bar” 
(Wagner 2013). Notably, Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac (2010) argue that a variety of conditions 
may determine extensiveness and fidelity of practice adoption, including cases of increased 
extensiveness with low fidelity. These are independent of a Race over time. 
Hypothesis 3. Where conditions for the RTT are met, information signals foster learning 
to accelerate increased fidelity in practice adoption. 
 Tests of these hypotheses, and particularly tests that distinguish extensiveness from 
fidelity, require advanced empirical approaches. Moreover, a thorough examination 
requires data from markets in which the expressed conditions are largely met, in which 
information asymmetries exist but have been ameliorated through a policy program, and in 
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which multiple years of data are available. We first introduce one such setting, then develop 
a methodology that differentiates extensiveness and fidelity. 
 
4.4 Empirical Setting: LEED Certification 
In the real estate market, buyers (and tenants) prefer qualities like energy efficiency, 
healthy indoor environments, and often prefer sustainability. Yet because many of these 
qualities cannot be directly observed by the prospective buyer, information asymmetries 
have inhibited adoption of greener building practices (Matisoff, Noonan, and Flowers 
2016). In response, the US Green Building Council (USGBC) was founded in 1993 as a 
private organization that promotes sustainability in the built environment by operating the 
LEED certification program.  
Certification standards are set and frequently updated by vote of the open-
membership. These standards address all aspects of the building’s interaction with the 
environment, from construction material sourcing to occupant energy use. As a network, 
the USGBC membership consists of institutional and individual stakeholders from across 
diverse industries associated with construction, real estate, and the built environment. The 
organization invests in diffusing an understanding of its label by training professionals, 
who can obtain an Associated Professional (AP) credential after passing examination. 
USGBC members further interface with a federated system of international green building 
councils to facilitate diffusion of sustainable design practices.  
Even without a national green building regulation, the voluntary label has diffused 
quite rapidly labeling as much as 30 percent of commercial real estate space in rapidly 
growing cities (Kok and Holtermans 2014b). This success has been attributed in part to 
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LEED’s straightforward role as a signaling tool. Perhaps not surprisingly, rental and sales 
premiums tend to increase with certification (Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley 2010a). Because 
financial premiums increase as firms move up the tiers of certification (Eichholtz, Kok, 
and Quigley 2010b), organizations have incentives to certify at the minimum of their 
respective threshold, obtaining just enough LEED credits to get the desired premium.  
A building may become LEED certified if designers verify a variety of 
improvements to the building’s holistic environmental footprint for a third-party monitor. 
This monitoring limits free-riding (Delmas and Burbano 2011, Delmas and Keller 2005, 
Potoski and Prakash 2005a, b, 2009), alongside the additional costs of green construction 
and the direct costs of certification (Mason 2012). Thus, in pursuit of certification and its 
benefits, builders must demonstrate improvement to the building’s energy or water 
efficiency, site sustainability, material use, and design innovations. For each improvement 
demonstrated, the project earns “credit” or points towards a LEED score, measured 
continuously. After receiving 40 percent of total possible credits, a building can be 
certified. Higher certification tiers are awarded for reaching 50 (Silver), 60 (Gold), and 80 
(Platinum) percent of credits available. The arbitrary thresholds are not natural cut points 
in building technology investment, and because organizations can choose from a broad 
menu of options, organizations retain significant flexibility in choosing across different 
technology investments at all levels.  
The tiered structure of LEED certification provides space for differentiation of 
extensiveness from fidelity. First, extensiveness may be observed as the continuous 
differences in LEED scores. Second, the tiers provide incentives to overstate sustainability 
in pursuit of signaling benefits. The distribution of LEED scores resembles a sawtooth 
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pattern, with a plurality of observations at or just above certification thresholds, but a 
nontrivial density of buildings with point totals far from thresholds (Matisoff, Noonan, and 
Mazzolini 2014). Past work has suggested that, while those who obtain a LEED score that 
precisely matches a minimum requirement pursue marketing benefits, those who certify 
well beyond these minima do so for the performance benefits of additional sustainability 
(Matisoff, Noonan, and Mazzolini 2014). Because environmental performance is key to 
the USGBC’s original aim, those who certify well beyond thresholds are considered to 
have greater fidelity in their adaptation of the LEED certification system. Thus the distance 
between the tier threshold and the final LEED score reflects whether organizations oriented 
their decision making around the signaling scheme or the building’s environmental 
performance. By measuring the extent to which building projects occur closer or farther 
away from the thresholds over time, we measure the extent to which fidelity shifts. 
The tiered structure of LEED is not unique. Rather, tiered certifications and ratings 
are ubiquitous across industries, including restaurant safety ratings, bond and credit ratings, 
and several multitier ecolabels (Farhi, Lerner, and Tirole 2013, Fischer and Lyon 2013). 
This tiered program design helps provide more detailed information about product quality 
but still resembles a stacked binary signal, where the threshold to reach the next tier 
represents a distinct pass/fail determination. The tiers provide greater information 
compared to binary certifications, but create challenges in assessing changes in the 
distribution of green buildings (Matisoff, Noonan, and Flowers 2016).  
It can also be difficult to distinguish which builders certify for performance or 
marketing schemes, since the performance benefits increase monotonically with LEED 
scores, but marketing benefits accrue in discontinuous fashion. And, organizations do not 
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have to certify for only one of these benefits. Discussions with LEED builders and 
consultants suggest that some firms, after targeting a certification level, may consider 
additional cost-effective investments within that tier. Alternatively, other firms may plan 
the cost-effective credits first, and then decide if it is worthwhile to bump up to the next 
highest threshold. Additional complexity arises when those who prefer marketing benefits 
are risk averse. These builders ensure that they obtain a specific certification tier by 
buffering their scores with extra (typically two) points, scoring among those focused on 
performance benefits.  
Because the LEED label fits most of the essential assumptions necessary for a Race, 
we expect learning to occur. This may happen in two ways, which are not mutually 
exclusive. First, organizations learn about the structure of the ecolabel and how to 
strategically minimize effort while maximizing the marketing benefits associated with 
ecolabel participation (Lyon and Montgomery 2015). This is suggestive of the RTB. 
Second, organizations learn about the value of the practices and technologies that underpin 
the ecolabels themselves and how to select and implement appropriate technologies. 
Learning that improves environmental performance is indicative of the RTT. After 
checking for diffusion (accelerated adoption) and increased extensiveness (higher LEED 
tiers), we develop a notches methodology that distinguishes relative weights for marketing 
and performance benefits in the distribution over time to examine evidence of shifting 
fidelity, characteristic of a Race.  
 
4.5 Data: LEED Certification over Time 
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Data are obtained from the USGBC’s complete listing of all LEED certified buildings in 
the United States. The available data include LEED point total, certification level, project 
name and address, LEED scoring system used, project type, buildings size, and site context. 
We restrict our analysis to the buildings within the LEED New Construction (LEED NC) 
versions 2.0–2.2, in which building scores are computed similarly, in order to maintain 
consistent reference points for certification and simplify results to comparable metrics 
based on a single set of building codes.	
Under LEED NC 2.0-2.2, buildings must achieve at least 26 points to become 
Certified, at least 33 points for a Silver certification, 39 points for Gold certification, and 
52 points or more. On average, buildings score 37.3 LEED points, though non-profits score 
higher (38.1 points on average) compared to government and for-profit entities (averaging 
37.5 and 36.4, respectively). In the LEED NC sample, 19.4 percent are Certified, 33.4 
percent are Silver, 40 percent are Gold, and six percent achieve Platinum. 
The frequency of LEED buildings at all certified scores is displayed in Figure 2. 
About 46% of buildings earn point totals that are either at or just above these certification 
thresholds. Building scores that are just below each threshold are rare. The extreme 
lumpiness of these data likely do not result from an underlying smooth distribution, but 
rather from the discontinuous signaling benefits that accrue at each threshold (Matisoff, 
Noonan, and Mazzolini 2014). 
We divide our data into categories by owner type and building use. Of the 4,486 
total projects, 2,039 are owned by government agencies, with a little over half of these 
owned by federal or state governments and the remainder by local governments. For-profit 
entities own 1,445 of the buildings, and non-profits own 1,018. Buildings are also separated 
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by primary use according to the information provided to the USGBC at the time of LEED 
registration and certification. This partitions buildings by whether they are put to use as 
commercial office (N=1,338), retail (427), healthcare (268), restaurant (159), hotel (92), or 
schools at the local (513) or higher education (773) levels. Altogether, commercial 
buildings make up 1,758 observations, or almost 40% of our data.  
4.6 Early Evidence of Diffusion and Increased Extensiveness of LEED Adoption 
From the stated hypotheses, we expect that LEED, as signaling tool in a market that 
approximates the conditions required for the RTT, fosters learning. So, we anticipate (1) 
widespread diffusion of the standard, (2) increased extensiveness of certification, and (3) 
increased fidelity of certification pathways to the original aims of the program. To the first, 
numerous studies confirm the widespread use of the LEED label, in the US and abroad 
(Kok and Holtermans 2014b). Our data confirm the trend: each year, the number of new 
buildings added under the LEED-NC 2.2 certification standards grows, peaking just after 
2010, when a new version of LEED-NC (v2009) standards was initiated (observations in 
this new version are excluded from study, though it may have been pursued by some high 
achievers during the period of study). 
Though the diffusion of a practice can be measured as a straightforward frequency, 
extensiveness and fidelity are not so simple. A rudimentary measure of extensiveness may 
be simply the LEED score or corresponding certification tier. The distribution of LEED 
certifications generally increases at higher scores and tiers over time. Figure 3 demonstrates 
that roughly one-third of buildings certify at the Silver level during each of those years. 
The annual portion of buildings certifying Gold rose from less than 25 percent to over 40 
percent of new buildings over the period from 2005 and 2009. The portion of buildings 
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certifying Platinum remains between about five and seven percent each year, although the 
number of Platinum buildings added annually grows almost every year. Notably, 2008 
seems to be an outlier year, where Gold certification dropped and Silver spiked.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. Observed distribution of LEED building scores. 
 
Though Figure 3 might appear to support Hypothesis 2, this is not sufficient to demarcate 
the RTT. In addition to the increasing extensiveness, we require a distinct measure of 
fidelity. Past analysis of the tiered LEED certification structure reveals that, at any 
particular LEED score, the decision to adopt is driven by a mix of both environmental (or 
energy) performance improvements and signaling (or marketing) benefits, and that the 
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observed distribution is extremely unlikely without this mix of motivations (Corbett and 
Muthulingam 2007). The average extent to which signaling versus performance motivates 
adoption has been identified with an adapted regression discontinuity approach (Matisoff, 
Noonan, and Mazzolini 2014). We build on that methodology to examine shifts in 
motivations over time. Given support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 suggests the existence of a 
Race, we take evidence on the shift in motivations as the distinguishing factor for a RTT 
or RTB. That is, if the prevailing motivations for certification trend towards performance 
over signaling, we observe the RTT. If the converse is observed, trends are consistent with 
the RTB, as signaling and marketing benefits drive adoption with less fidelity to the 
original aim of environmental performance.  
 
 









2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Certified Silver Gold Platinum
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4.7 Method: Distinguishing Extensiveness From Fidelity 
Measuring the extent to which marketing and performance drive adoption is nontrivial, 
especially in a multitier setting like LEED. Following Kleven and Waseem (2013), we 
begin by constructing a counterfactual distribution in the absence of the multitier 
thresholds, without making restrictive or theoretical assumptions about how that 
counterfactual should be shaped. The counterfactual imagines a setting without signaling 
schemes; only project attributes drive the counterfactual distribution. This counterfactual 
allows us to compare the observed distribution to a plausible, conservative estimation of 
what would have occurred in the absence of tiered thresholds. Thus, the counterfactual is 
a conservative estimation of the distribution created when performance drives all 
certification, and excess density in the observed distribution is explained by marketing 
motivations.  
After characterizing the extent to which marketing drives the observed distribution 
and comparing across building types, we observe how these changes with time. We test for 
these trends across owner types and building uses. If greater performance motivations drive 
the certification, we observe improved fidelity, and conclude the RTT has been induced by 
the voluntary information program. If greater emphasis is placed on signaling benefits, we 
observe diminished fidelity, we conclude the weak form of the RTB.  
4.7.1 Measuring Signaling and Performance Motivations in a Tiered Setting 
First, to determine the extent to which signaling (marketing) benefits drive 
certification, at each possible LEED score, a counterfactual distribution of LEED buildings 
is constructed to describe a hypothetical distribution of buildings where no certification 
thresholds exist. In this counterfactual distribution, building attributes are described only 
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by the continuous LEED certification score. A key assumption in this analysis is that the 
benefits from specific project attributes increase with each additional LEED point, and are 
locally smooth around certification thresholds. Following the notches methodology 
employed by Kleven and Waseem (2013), a locally smooth polynomial function is 
generated based on the observed distribution of buildings with LEED scores.  
 If LEED building scores reflect only benefits related to LEED building 
performance, excluding signaling benefits accruing discontinuously around the 
certification thresholds, the observed distribution would be smooth, peaking in density at 
the average score that is cost-effective on building performance grounds alone (Corbett and 
Muthulingam 2007). In Figure 2, we observe an abrupt jump in frequency at each threshold, 
with far more signaling driving certifications just above a threshold, and very little 
performance driving certification immediately below the threshold. In constructing the 
counterfactual, the regions above and below the cutoff are effectively dropped, eliminating 
the pronounced discontinuities visible in the observed distribution. We then generate a 
locally smooth polynomial based on the remaining observations, creating a feasible and 
empirically determined counterfactual distribution to approximate a distribution unaffected 
by strategic behavior around the thresholds. If signaling does not affect the observed 
distribution, the counterfactual imagined would be a near-perfect match of the distribution 
observed in Figure 2. 
The construction of this polynomial is sensitive to the bandwidth selected for local 
smoothing, the degree of the polynomial employed, and the range of LEED scores omitted 
around the thresholds. A tradeoff exists between matching the observed distribution and 
generating a smoother counterfactual. It is important that the counterfactual match the 
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observed distribution over regions between thresholds, where observations’ scores are 
most closely tied to the building’s environmental performance. To make the counterfactual 
more closely shaped to the observed distribution, omitting fewer scores around the 
thresholds and maintaining a smaller bandwidth is preferable.  
By contrast, a smoother polynomial, derived by dropping more of the observed 
distribution while constructing the counterfactual, is closer to some expectations of a 
distribution without signaling.5  And, many seeking marketing benefits will buffer their 
LEED scores, ensuring attainment of a particular LEED tier. Omitting more of the 
distribution from the counterfactual prevents these signalers from entering the performance 
distribution. In turn, which would skew results by inflating the counterfactual densities at 
and just above thresholds, and deflating the appearance of excess density due to scheme 
orientation. Tighter windows of omission thus give a more conservative estimate of tier 
effect signaling. By contrast, a larger window makes the counterfactual smoother or 
consistent with theoretical priors, but draws less on the empirical density. 
For this analysis, we drop building scores within two LEED points of the threshold 
and estimate a second-degree locally-smoothed polynomial over the remaining data, 
selecting a bandwidth of two. This bandwidth choice enables us to select a point value 
(which may or may not serve as a certification threshold), and smooth over the observed 
distribution of buildings at that value, the value above it, and the two below it. Dropping a  
																																																						
5 Corbett and Muthulingam (2007) contend that a distribution driven by attribute 
orientation must be unimodal. The authors impose various distributions to determine the 
most appropriate explanation for the empirical multi-modal LEED distribution. We remain 
less restrictive about the shape of the expected distribution, simply estimating a smooth 




Figure 4.4. Observed and counterfactual building distributions. Counterfactual 
distribution constructed with locally smoothed polynomial.  
 
 
larger window is infeasible, because there would be little density left in between thresholds 
left to estimate a counterfactual. Matching the bandwidth to the window of dropped scores 
enables interpolation of a smooth distribution over the region of missing observations, 
though an alternative bandwidth is explored in the robustness checks.6 The resulting 
polynomial creates a counterfactual distribution of LEED buildings that is conservative 
with respect to its theoretical presumptions and is consistent with our discussions with 
																																																						
6 Robustness checks contain results based on a bandwidth of four, which appears 
more similar to a Normal or Chi-squared distribution, though still maintains local 
maxima in the Certified and Platinum tiers. 
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green building professionals (LEED AP community) regarding the extent to which 
organizations buffer their scores. 
The observed and counterfactual distributions are graphed in Figure 4. The 
counterfactual distribution, describing a distribution without marketing motivations, is 
compared to the observed distribution, which includes both marketing and performance 
motivations. Marketing drives the portion of the observed frequency that exceeds the 
counterfactual at each LEED score. For each score, we difference the distributions, and 
divide by the number of observations composing the observed frequency. This calculation 
estimates the relative revealed preference for signaling benefits above marketing benefits 
for each LEED score. The unique values are distributed across each building with that 
score. To avoid double-counting, and because we are interested only in the excess of 
buildings above thresholds due to signaling motivations, values are censored to preserve 
only nonnegative values. 
The average relative revealed preference (ARRP) for signaling at each LEED score 
i can be defined as:  
ARRPi = (ni – ci) / ni  (1)  
where n is the number of buildings observed and c is the counterfactual frequency. Thus, a 
building scoring at or just above a certification threshold, where the observed frequency is 
much higher than expected by the counterfactual, reveals a very high signaling preference. 
If the frequencies observed in the data and predicted by the counterfactual are similar at a 
given building’s score, buildings in that range of the distribution reveal little or no signaling 
preference, marked by a value close to zero. These observations are considered more 
performance motivated. Because this definition simply implies that the densest points in 
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Figure 4.5. Changes in LEED NC score distribution over time.  A locally-smooth 
polynomial, calculated in the same fashion as the counterfactual used throughout this work, is 




the observed distribution will correspond to high signaling preference, and the low density 
regions of the distribution correspond to low signaling preference (greater performance 
preference), our results remain consistent across a wide range of potential counterfactual 
functions, as demonstrated in the robustness checks. After revealing signaling preferences 
for each LEED building score, we calculate aggregate revealed preference across tiers 
(SARRPini for all i belonging to Tier, divided by observations certified at Tier), and for 
subsamples of particular building and owner types. Averages draw on counterfactuals 
derived from the entire sample. 
4.7.2 Signaling Preferences over Time 
Next we observe changes in the prevailing preferences over time, overall and by 
owner type. This lets us determine whether signaling or performance motivations comes to 
dominate, and whether trends are consistent for each level of certification. Shifts in 
motivations provide evidence regarding the potential Race that may arise when learning 
occurs. To know that increased adoption is not simply the result of greenwashing, we must 
observe increased preferences for performance, or decreased preference for signaling. 
Such calculations require the composition of separate counterfactuals for each of 
the years of interest. We generate counterfactuals for several time periods, based on only 
on observations in subsets of years. Results are depicted graphically in Figure 5. We assess 
trends over time by calculating the ARRP for each year T, including only observations in 
year t £ T. We also compute these trends for subsamples based on owner types, referencing 




Signaling ARRPs are assigned to each building based on the counterfactual distribution 
obtained from the locally smooth polynomial. Results demonstrate that many LEED 
buildings cluster at and above each certification threshold (seen in Figure 2), suggesting 
strong signaling preferences for buildings certified at these LEED scores. Few buildings 
attain scores just below the threshold, where performance motivations dominate and 
signaling motivation is minimized. Figure 4 displays the distinction between the observed 
sawtooth distribution that occurs in the presence of signaling preferences, and the 
counterfactual distribution constructed entirely on building performance. The 
counterfactual is a conservative estimate, likely undervaluing signaling preferences by 
underestimating the extent of signaling motivations. Results in the robustness checks depict 
a less conservative smoothing bandwidth of four, which creates a nearly unimodal 
distribution and produces large estimates of scheme orientation.  
4.8.1 Variation by Building Owner and Use 
Table 2 displays the aggregate revealed preference for signaling among all 
observations, and for various subsamples defined by the building’s owner type, 
certification level, or end use. For all 4,486 LEED buildings, a little over 2% motivated by 
signaling at the Silver tier, versus almost 6% at the Gold tier, and 1% at the Platinum tier. 
Put another way, at least one in ten LEED-certified buildings have upgraded to the next 
higher threshold due to a signaling benefits. (Our alternative counterfactual, described in 
the robustness checks, estimates that signaling motivates 17% of adopters.) 
All subsamples demonstrate some signaling preference, relative to performance 
preference. Results for all owner types show more signaling at the Platinum and Gold tiers, 
highlighting the role of information signals in motivating the greatest improvements. This 
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trend is especially pronounced for the for-profit subsample, with 16.7% and 19.3% of Gold 
and Platinum certifications motivated more by signaling than performance.  
 
 
Table 4.2. Signalling Preferences by Subsample. Percentage represents excess share of 
certified buildings motivated primarily by signaling benefits.    
    Aggregate Revealed Preference for Signaling 
Group Size Certified Silver Gold Platinum Net 
All 4486 0.03 2.26 6.22 1.11 9.62 
Federal / State 
Government 1057 0.03 2.06 6.85 1.22 10.15 
Local Government 985 0.03 2.33 5.80 0.99 9.15 
For-Profit 1445 0.04 2.43 6.03 0.86 9.35 
Non-Profit 1018 0.03 2.14 6.24 1.47 9.88 
Certified 870 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 
Silver 1542 0.00 6.57 0.00 0.00 6.57 
Gold 1806 0.00 0.00 15.45 0.00 15.45 
Platinum 268 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.53 18.53 
At Least Silver 3616 0.00 2.80 7.72 1.37 11.89 
At Least Gold 2074 0.00 0.00 13.45 2.40 15.85 
For Profit Certified 340 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 
For Profit Silver 518 0.00 6.79 0.00 0.00 6.79 
For Profit Gold 523 0.00 0.00 16.65 0.00 16.65 
For Profit Platinum 64 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.31 19.31 
Profit- At Least Silver 1105 0.00 3.18 7.88 1.12 12.18 
Profit- At Least Gold 587 0.00 0.00 14.83 2.11 16.94 
Higher Education 773 0.03 1.90 7.47 1.77 11.17 
Local Schools 513 0.03 2.43 5.61 0.76 8.83 
Health 268 0.04 2.28 6.77 0.48 9.57 
Hotel 92 0.02 3.98 6.96 0.86 11.82 
Restaurant 159 0.04 2.77 7.03 0.77 10.61 
Retail 427 0.03 2.12 5.72 0.85 8.72 
Office 1338 0.03 2.19 5.76 1.20 9.18 
Mixed Commercial 1758 0.03 2.27 5.94 1.12 9.35 
 
 
Notably, local schools and higher education buildings show quite different 
preferences, and highlight the differences in behavior seen across building sectors. Local 
schools exhibit below-average signaling preferences on aggregate (<9%), with more 
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certifications coming from the Certified or Silver tiers. In contrast, higher education 
buildings are more likely to be motivated by signaling at the Gold and Platinum tiers.  
4.8.2 Variation over Time 
 Table 3 displays changes in excess signaling motivations over time. For the full 
sample, the relative aggregate signaling preferences fall erratically over time, from 17.1% 
at the start to 10.3% when the most current observations are included. Declines in signaling 
motivation are consistent with the type of learning required in the RTT. This trend is 
reflected within the Certified, Silver, and Gold certification levels, but partially offset by 
increases in Platinum signaling. 
Table 3 also shows these trends for subsamples based on owner types. These results 
highlight a stronger trend of decreased marketing in the for-profit subsample than in the 
government and non-profit subsamples. The government and non-profit subsamples 
decrease marketing over time somewhat, but this trend is more pronounced for for-profit 
buildings, where it is evident across all certification levels (with the exception of Platinum). 
Just over 18.25% of for-profit buildings revealed preference for signaling from 2000 – 
2004, decreasing to 10.13% in the 2000-2013 sample. This result demonstrates that while 
the government and non-profit sectors have been consistently motivated by signaling, the 
for-profit sector began especially motivated by signals. But, as more certified, firms 
increasingly certified for the environmental performance benefits of certification. By 2013, 
the average for-profit building was slightly less likely to be a “signaler” than the average 
non-profit or government building. This is consistent with the assertion that a Race is 
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4.8.3 Robustness Checks 
There are many potential forms of the counterfactual used for this analysis. In 
addition to the counterfactual and results presented above, we test a variety of alternative 
expectations. These may be derived theoretically, as done by Corbett and Muthulingam 
(2007), or a notches approach to empirically estimate the counterfactual. Results are robust 
for all smooth counterfactuals tested, due to the way signaling benefits that accrue 
discontinuously at certification thresholds, where the observed distribution peaks strongly. 
Though ARP values vary with methodological choices, the trends are consistent. Below 
we summarize results from one alternate form of the counterfactual. 
As before, we construct an empirically-driven counterfactual using a notch 
approach. In the previous form of the counterfactual, this was executed by ignoring 
observations within two LEED points of a threshold, then constructing a second-degree 
locally-smooth polynomial across the remaining distribution, smoothing over a bandwidth 
of two. In the alternative counterfactual below (Figure 6), we continue to ignore this same 
window of observations, while smoothing with a first-degree (linear) polynomial, selecting 
a bandwidth of 4 points.  
The result is that this counterfactual has less curvature compared to the previous 
form. When smoothing over the larger bandwidth, the polynomial becomes less sensitive 
to the steep peaks in the observed data, further smoothing the lumpiness of the observed 
distribution. This alternative form of the counterfactual is perhaps more consistent with 
priors about certification in the absence of tiers. However, the initial counterfactual 
demonstrates similar results without deviating so extremely from initial observation.  
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Figure 4.6. Observed Building Distribution Alongside One Alternative 
Counterfactual. Counterfactual distribution constructed with locally smoothed 
polynomial of degree 1.  
 
 
  The change in counterfactual calculation has implications for how we understand 
temporal shifts. Under this methodology, we exacerbate differences across thresholds, 
building categories, and time. Figure 7 displays how the counterfactual evolves over time. 
As before, the distribution of buildings shifts to higher thresholds, with fading peaks. The 
clarity with which the reader can observe the upward shift in the distribution from this 
counterfactual affirms the RTT: less marketing emphasis indicates less greenwashing. 
 Finally, we observe signaling preferences with this counterfactual calculation just 






Figure 4.7. Changes in LEED NC Score Distribution over Time.  This locally-smooth 




for each building category. These differences can be directly observed in Table 4. The 
counterfactual is also computed for each year T, including observations built in year t ≤ T. 
The temporal trends are again observed in Table 5. 
 Note that results are again similar, with a few modifications. Because this version 
of the counterfactual rises less at observed peaks, the computed values for scheme 
orientation are larger for almost all LEED scores, suggesting a greater proportion of  
 
 
Table 4.4. Signalling Motivations by Subsample Under the Alternative 
Counterfactual. Percentage represents excess share of certified buildings motivated 
primarily by signaling benefits. 
    Aggregate Revealed Preference for Signaling 
Group Size Certified Silver Gold Platinum Net 
All 4486 0.28 7.15 7.95 1.49 16.86 
Federal or State Gov 1057 0.21 7.46 8.80 1.59 18.07 
Local Gov 985 0.23 7.49 7.27 1.38 16.37 
For-Profit 1445 0.32 6.83 7.75 1.14 16.04 
Non-Profit 1018 0.32 6.92 7.97 2.01 17.22 
Certified 870 1.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.42 
Silver 1542 0.00 20.77 0.00 0.00 20.77 
Gold 1806 0.00 0.00 19.74 0.00 19.74 
Platinum 268 0.00 0.00 0.00 24.92 24.92 
At Least Silver 3616 0.00 8.86 9.86 1.85 20.56 
At Least Gold 2074 0.00 0.00 17.19 3.22 20.41 
For-Profit Certified 340 1.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.33 
For-Profit Silver 518 0.00 18.97 0.00 0.00 18.97 
For-Profit Gold 523 0.00 0.00 21.42 0.00 21.42 
For-Profit Platinum 64 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.79 25.79 
Firm- At Least Silver 1105 0.00 8.89 10.14 1.49 20.52 
Firm- At Least Gold 587 0.00 0.00 19.08 2.81 21.89 
Higher Education 773 0.23 6.03 9.72 2.31 18.30 
Local Schools 513 0.30 7.51 7.15 1.06 16.02 
Health 268 0.40 7.79 8.69 0.55 17.42 
Hotel 92 0.32 8.98 8.91 1.16 19.37 
Restaurant 159 0.33 7.21 8.96 0.98 17.48 
Retail 427 0.22 7.02 7.36 1.11 15.72 
Office 1338 0.29 6.81 7.41 1.58 16.08 
Mixed Commercial 1758 0.28 7.02 7.61 1.48 16.38 
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buildings certified for signaling gains. More interestingly, the relative value of signaling 
preference at the Silver threshold is larger in comparison to the Gold threshold for this 
form. Under the former counterfactual, almost all signaling preference was observed at the 
Gold level; under the present form, Silver and Gold comprise nearly equal shares, though 
Gold remains largest for almost all sectors and years. 
 
4.9 Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
We began from a seemingly simple question: can a voluntary program induce a Race to 
the Top? An answer to this question required a careful definition of the Race to the Top, in 
order to identify the way in which a non-regulatory approach might induce a Race of any 
kind. The origins of the theory draw on regulatory differentiation under interjurisdictional 
competition. Yet these do not appear particularly useful for drawing expectations around 
non-regulatory policy mechanisms. Worse, the theory has been repeatedly called to 
question by empirical studies refuting the Race. Despite the frequent theoretical and 
empirical critiques of the Race, it has remained an intriguing notion to scholars in many 
fields. To satisfy our collective curiosity, we consider an alternative approach the notion 
of a Race. 
 In place of the regulatory differentiation mechanism, we establish a set of 
conditions through which a Race might be established with an information mechanism. 
Noting that a Race need not occur if a market is at a socially optimal equilibrium, we 
deduce that the Race begins from market failure. Specifically, information asymmetries 
inhibit optimal consumer choice. By providing an information signal, firms face initial 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































improvement (Figure 1). This cascade effect has long been the hallmark of diffusion studies 
(Berry and Berry 2007), but has not been explicitly applied to a Race hypothesis. Diffusion 
studies are distinguished from the Race hypothesis based on how the adopted form of the 
practice evolves or remains stable over time.  
Critically, this theory provides a mechanism by which a broad set of treatments and 
interventions may induce a Race. Though work on regulatory differentiation pertains only 
to command-and-control policy, modern policy designs increasingly draw on market- and 
information-based mechanisms, including voluntary programs. And, though regulatory 
differentiation as a mechanism is limited to competition among political jurisdictions, 
modern policymaking occurs through numerous non-state actors, such as from non-profits, 
interest groups, and industry coalitions. That these actors might introduce information that 
could induce a Race in local or global markets, even without political authority, is an 
important shift in our conceptualization of the notions of a Race to the Top, Race to the 
Bottom, or other market transformation. These are not purely regulatory outcomes, but 
rather emerge from correction of market failures that foster learning. 
 Further, the perspective we develop provides a functioning theory for the RTT and 
the RTB. That is, distinctive types of learning can incentivize adoption of a practice that 
has either more or less extensiveness and fidelity over time. Discussion here has focused 
on the RTT. Yet the RTB is expected under a slight variation from these same conditions. 
Absent enforcement, greenwashing, or adoption with diminished fidelity, can disrupt the 
RTT, and reward firms for overstating their environmental performance. We have termed 
this the weak form of the RTB.  Alternatively, the strong form of the RTB expects both 
extensiveness and fidelity to diminish over time. That is, environmental performance 
	 117 
worsens as a result of the information mechanism. This can occur, we argue, if 
organizations can learn to manipulate the information signals in their favor. This not only 
creates greenwashing, but also creates room for a sort of ‘regulatory’ gaming in which 
firms can influence the standard-setting process, curtailing future stringency (Maxwell, 
Lyon, and Hackett 2000).  
 Whether producing the RTB or the RTT, the learning perspective on Racing is 
contingent on a variety of assumptions. In addition to the assumptions stated explicitly in 
Table 1, a variety of contextual factors may inhibit the completion of the Race cycle. To 
name a few, the network structure may inhibit knowledge diffusion from those that have 
adopted to those who might adopt; other limitations of organizational capacity may inhibit 
learning from experience. Despite these potential limitations, data from LEED certified 
buildings are highly suggestive of a Race to the Top. Over time, LEED certification 
diffuses rapidly (Hypothesis 1), with greater portions of adopters choosing higher 
certification tiers, and higher LEED scores (Hypothesis 2). Across all subsamples, 
buildings generally certify just above the certification thresholds, demonstrating that 
building owners have invested additional resources to achieve a higher level of certification 
(Matisoff, Noonan, and Mazzolini 2014). Over time, we observe that builders are less likely 
to construct buildings that achieve a point total just above the threshold scores for 
certification, emphasizing performance gains over marketing benefits (Hypothesis 3).  
 Methodologically, we extend existing approaches that examine notches to identify 
distinctions in the signaling and performance motivations in a tiered setting. We anchor 
this measurement closely to the notion of fidelity and extensiveness in practice adoption, 
respectively. This allows us to construct meaningful measures of distributional shifts in the 
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multitier framework, and examine evidence of a true Race to the Top. Without this 
distinction, it cannot be determined whether shifts are due to improved environmental 
performance, or simply to greenwashing. However, a multitier setting is not required for 
analysis of a Race per se. Information-based interventions take many forms, from which 
alternative operationalization of fidelity and extensiveness might be adopted. 
Results suggest a RTT in the case of LEED certification, though the extent to which 
this phenomenon is generalizable is not particularly clear. If LEED is a singular 
phenomenon, we take little away from our analysis. An assessment of the LEED 
certification suggests affirms for program design more broadly. First, LEED is a 
certification, not simply a label that can be attached without substantive improvement. This 
enforcement mechanism imposes some costs to certification but appears effective in 
ensuring a stable signal of environmental quality. Second, that the USGBC actively 
cultivates network formation and learning through its AP trainings, its online platform for 
showcasing advances, and its connections with global actors with similar interests. The 
catalyst role that this network plays in maintaining the upward trajectory of the Race may 
be quite large. Third, the tiered structure provides slightly more information than a binary 
rating, yet may be concisely understood. And this structure provides incentive to reach a 
higher signal of environmental quality. That LEED frequently updates the certification 
standard to raise the bar for certification provides room for continuous growth.  
With these design features, LEED appears effective at driving a RTT. This stands 
contrary to past expectations from the traditional Race to the Bottom literature, in which 
competition drives costly quality down over time. In fact, for-profit firms in the LEED data 
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CHAPTER 5: LEARNING OR LOCK-IN? THE EVOLUTION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 
Voluntary and information-based policy approaches are increasingly popular tools for 
addressing environmental concerns, in part due to their flexibility, which is thought to 
prevent the technological lock-in resulting from more stringent regulatory approaches. But 
does the widespread adoption of a voluntary practice indicate its success? As practices of 
any kind spread, they are likely to evolve. This may be due to learning, by which 
organizations become more proficient at a practice as they gain collective experience, or 
may be due to late adopters seeking marketing gains by only symbolically adopting a 
practice. Voluntary programs that include monitoring to limit free-riding are thought to 
limit the latter, but empirical research is ambiguous about the persistence of environmental 
outcomes of these programs. To fill this gap, this paper investigates trends in the green 
building movement, which has spread widely in recent years. Green certified real estate 
that mitigates environmental footprints with regard to a number of concerns. Analysis of 
the dynamics of green technology choice reveal an increased emphasis on energy 
efficiency, but also suggest a diminished interest in providing public goods. These results 
suggests trade-offs between the flexibility and simplicity of a voluntary program. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Investors in the real estate industry increasingly expect environmental certification when 
considering additions to their property portfolios (Eichholtz, Kok, and Yonder 2012). 
These programs, such as the tiered Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
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(LEED) certification, verify improvements to a building’s holistic environmental footprint 
(Matisoff, Noonan, and Flowers 2016). In recent years, buildings have certified LEED in 
greater numbers (Kok and Holtermans 2014a, Kok, McGraw, and Quigley 2011), at higher 
certification tiers (Chapter 4), and overall appear to be increasingly sustainable. This may 
be the result of policies promoting green building (Matisoff, Noonan, and Flowers 2016), 
learning (Chapter 4), the potential operations savings of efficient building design (Asensio 
and Delmas 2017), and/or the promise of premium market returns to green certification 
(Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley 2010a) as a signal of quality.  
 Such successively greener management appears to challenge past work suggesting 
that adoption becomes increasingly symbolic as a practice diffuses (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983, Kennedy and Fiss 2009). Symbolic management may be the result of a variety of 
institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) to adopt, even when the “fit,” or the 
extent to which the certification and adopter are aligned in terms of demands and goals 
(Nadler and Tushman 1980) is dynamic (Zajac, Kraatz, and Bresser 2000). Though this 
literature generally acknowledges that practices diffuse, the models do not anticipate 
incrementally more substantive practices over time.  
 But is environmental management actually improving environmental performance? 
Many have noted positive improvements, others note no or negative effects (Koehler 
2007), while still others note diminishing environmental effectiveness of program adoption 
(Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2010, Toffel 2006). In the real estate industry, much 
disagreement exists over the extent to which green buildings save energy and avert 
emissions (Kats 2003), though recent work draws on advanced matching to identify 
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significant efficiency improvements in certified real estate (Asensio and Delmas 2017). 
However, sustainability is a complex goal, relating to numerous practices and outcomes.  
Though market interventions and public policies often promote multifaceted aims 
like sustainability, innovation, and health, such complexity renders progress difficult to 
assess (Stavins 1998). These constructs may be operationalized in numerous ways. In lieu 
of succinct observable outcomes, we often construct compound indexes of performance 
and observe changes in aggregate. For example, sustainability indexes have been tracked 
by the Dow Jones, the Earth Science Information Network, and portions of the KLD scores, 
with no clear best method. In order to understand what changes mean for progress toward 
a goal, we must open the black box of opaque indexes (Wijen 2014).  
For environmental performance, this potentially means considering all possible 
approaches to addressing all possible externalities – a daunting task. Following Ansari, 
Fiss, and Zajac (2010), we may reduce our approach to understand the adaptation of 
practices in two dimensions, fidelity and extensiveness. This literature points to several 
propositions anticipating the dynamic relationship between loss of “fit” and reduced 
fidelity or extensiveness. The following draws on data from LEED building certification 
pathways over time, demonstrating how these shifts manifest, despite competing 
expectations. The certification system is first introduced before analysis is presented. The 
discussion emphasizes lessons for policy design.  
 
5.2 The Case of LEED 
As a voluntary certification program, LEED was created by a private organization to 
improve the design and environmental impact of the building sector, and to promote 
	 127 
corporate social responsibility. The program works by verifying sets of improvements 
across a flexible menu of options; those who demonstrate sufficient sustainability become 
LEED Certified, and can become LEED Silver, Gold, or Platinum if they can prove even 
greater sustainable practices. Builders can earn “credits” for improvements to dozens of 
characteristics, impacting the near and long-term energy, water, land use, air quality, and 
natural resource footprint of the edifice. Though many of these technologies, like energy 
efficiency, offer cost-saving potential, others do not. Those which do not reduce cost are 
all associated with some type of public benefit, in line with an explicit aim of the LEED 
platform to provide public goods.  
 This multifaceted approach creates noisy quality signals, in which different builders 
certify through very different types of changes to the environmental impact. This noise 
may be understood as the result of two non-orthogonal dimensions (Chapter 3). First, the 
fidelity with which builders replicate existing norms may be observed by the extent to 
which they deviate from the general rule for assuring certification, surpassing requirements 
by scoring two or three points above the requirement. If they obtain far more than this, the 
certification under-represents the building’s quality, in a brownwash. If they obtain less, 
the certification over-states quality compared to others with the certification, in a 
greenwash.  
The degree of disclosure exacerbates differences in the second dimension: 
extensiveness of adoption differentiates the types of observable building characteristics that 
justify the quality signal. Those seeking certification can adopt practices that mostly benefit 
their bottom line, such as energy and water efficiency. Though efficiency is certainly 
beneficial, it strays from the aim of producing public benefits. That is, the externality of 
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energy use is only indirectly related to the externalities of energy production, and so 
provides highly variable public benefits, with much clearer returns due to averted utility 
expenditures. That LEED buildings can vary in both fidelity and extensiveness creates a 
noisy signal of quality (Chapter 1).  
 
5.3 Opening the “Black Box” of Certification Pathways 
Despite some expectation that quality would diminish under signal noise (Stiglitz 2000), 
LEED appears to foster learning in the buildings industry, such that more become certified, 
LEED tiers and scores increase, and marketing seems a less important driver of this trend 
(Chapter 4). Presumably, these higher scores mean greater benefits to the public (as the 
probability of adopting any particular LEED credit strictly increases as more of the 
available credits are adopted). Yet the marginal credit earned toward certification is often 
related to private gains, such as energy efficiency, rather than public gains (Chapter 2). 
This seems to suggest that certification fills some of the energy efficiency gap by 
addressing some market failures, but fails to provide public goods. On the other hand, the 
signaling benefits of LEED tiers appear to become less important over time (Chapter 4). 
So, the practice of leveraging added efficiency to pass from one tier to the next may not 
undermine the program’s aim of promoting corporate social responsibility and public 
goods.  
Our understanding of LEED as a program that has induced improved environmental 
outcomes over time relies on two assumptions. First, that the technologies conferring 
private benefits have been properly identified; and second, that LEED scores directly relate 
to public good provision. The former can be identified in engineering studies or can be 
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observed anecdotally. The latter requires analysis of the certification pathways. To know 
whether progress has been made to incentivize public good provision under the LEED 
label, data from certifications throughout the lifespan of a LEED label may be observed. 
Expectations regarding this evolution may be drawn from a variety of perspectives. 
First, signaling theory anticipates noisier signals, with greater emphasis on marketing 
benefits among late adopters hoping to free-ride on premiums (Stiglitz 2000, Potoski and 
Prakash 2009). This would be observable as the increase in quality variation (more mixing 
of public and private goods), and as the increased focus on marketing benefits, or even 
greenwashing. On the other hand, the organizations literature suggests that late adopters 
will certify less extensively (Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac 2010), more symbolically (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983), or by focusing more on avoiding losses than pursuing gains (Kennedy 
and Fiss 2009). These expectations all suggest greater emphasis on efficiency and private 
benefits, rather than public good provision.  
Alternative perspectives suggest related, but distinct hypothesis. Learning suggests 
that, as organizations become more proficient at certifying through the least-cost means, 
certification pathways will focus increasingly on technologies with rapidly falling costs 
(Spence 1981). In this case, convergence occurs as collective experience and innovation 
reveal cost-minimizing pathways. Convergence may also be the result of institutional 
pressures to adopt, which can foster the use of “off the shelf” (conforming) design, rather 
than tailored (customized) design (Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell 1997). Alternatively, 
certification may be adopted in response to emerging problems and dialogues (Kingdon 
1984). This suggests that, as public attention shifts to address new environmental concerns, 
such as habitat and species loss, climate change, or indoor air pollutants, certification 
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Table 5.1. Qualitative Credits and How They Relate to Each Theory. 
Certification 
Pathway Description LEED Credits 
Private Benefits 
Provides Return on 
Investment (ROI) 
based on efficiency 
Energy Efficiency, Onsite Renewable Energy, 
Enhanced Commissioning, Water Use 
Reduction 






Alternative Transportation (Public Transit 
Access, Bike Storage, EV Parking, Parking 
Capacity, Development Density and 
Walkability), Green Roof Spaces (Rooftop Heat 
Island Mitigation), Indoor Quality (Outdoor 
Air Monitoring, Increased Ventilation, Low 
Emitting Materials, Reduced Indoor 
Chemicals, Thermal Controls and Comfort, 
Daylighting, Views of the Outdoors) 





exposure or pollutant 
runoff 
Construction Waste Management, 
Construction Air Quality, Low Emitting 
Materials 
      
Increased 
Accessibility 
Increased demand or 
popularity lowers 
cost or increased 
availability 
Energy Efficiency, Onsite Renewable Energy, 
Green Power Purchasing, Water Efficiency, 
Construction Waste Management, Recycled 
Materials, Low Emitting Indoor Materials, 
LEED Accredited Professionals 
   
Ad hoc Changes 
Can be purchased and 
added, without 
advance design 
Recycled Materials, Local Materials, 
Renewable Materials, Certified Wood, Green 
Power Purchasing, Low Emitting Indoor 
Materials 
      
Visible Changes Can be observed without certification 
Bike storage, EV parking, Rooftop Heat Island 
Mitigation, On-site Renewable Energy, Water 
Efficient Landscaping, Daylighting, Views of 
the Outdoors 






through habitat and 
land preservation 
Brownfield Redevelopment, Habitat 
Protection, Maximize Open Space, Light 
Pollution Reduction, Certified Wood 
 
 
would increasingly assuage those concerns. From above, we can infer that convergence in 
certification pathways ought occur, with late adopters showing less variation in the 
technologies selected toward certification. 
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Hypothesis 1: Over time, certification pathways converge, showing less customization.  
Each of the assertions in Table 1 provides expectations about specific shifts in the 
types of technologies adopted for certification under the flexible LEED program. 
Distinguishing how certification pathways evolve requires observation of the technologies 
adopted for certification with analysis for trends over time. Past work has established 
differences in technologies adopted across market sectors and in pursuit of higher 
certification (Chapter 1). In the following, trends over time are assessed. To make sense of 
so much variation in technologies within the noisy certification framework, groups of 
environmental practices for which builders earn “credit” toward LEED certification are 
identified in terms of their relationship to each of the presented theories. In particular, the 
adaptation of LEED certification that provides public goods versus private gains is 
examined. Along the way, various other trends are noted. The environmental practices 
expected to emerge from the evolution of LEED certification under each perspective is 
summarized qualitatively in Table 1.  
By opening the “black box” of certification, we treat each practice as a separate 
quality, complicating analysis by introducing dozens of outcome variables. Yet, this high-
resolution approach also offers a unique opportunity to differentiate competing and 
complementary expectations about the emergent form of certification. That is, many 
theories can be asserted to explain any one trend, but few will jointly provide consistent 
explanations for trends along all characteristics embedded in the analysis (Stinchcombe 
1987). To preserve the power of this testing while minimizing the family-wise error rate 
(FWER), we can reassess trends with Bonferroni-corrected p-values (Bonferroni 1935, 
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1936). More simply, we can collect individual characteristics along dimensions of interest 
from Table 1, reducing the number of tests conducted.  
Analysis begins from expectations about learning. Consistent with psychological 
depictions of learning, Arrow (1962) described technical changes as related to accumulated 
experience in production that drive reduced labor costs. Conley (1970) extends this 
conceptualization to include all costs, measuring overall experience. Learning curves, 
which depict the exponential drop in costs as scale increases, have become a powerful tool 
for describing dynamic technology preferences (Williams and Tarzian 1993, Grubler, 
Nakicenovic, and Victor 1999). Because economic theory anticipates rational cost-
minimization in technology choice, the increased use, or diffusion, of emerging technology 
is expected under cost reductions and competition (Spence 1981). 
Hypothesis 2. Over time, certification pathways converge on reduced-cost technologies. 
However, not all increases in production or diffusion correspond to cost reductions 
(Yelle 1979), and not all cost reductions correspond to increased adoption (Lieberman 
1989). For example, Nemet (2006) describes organizational and market structures as key 
inhibitors of learning. From literature on institutional isomorphism, we observe a 
complimentary perspective that links the form of compliance to the motivations to comply. 
As a mechanism by which social and cultural influences impact strategic decision-making 
(Ingram and Silverman 2002), this body of literature broadly suggests that conformity to 
dominant practices confers legitimacy to those adopting (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Pursuing legitimacy, firms need only adopt practices symbolically (Meyer and Rowan 
1977), with or without tangible evidence of change. Pressures from regulatory agencies or 
competing firms may accelerate the decoupling of formal structures and actual practice 
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(DiMaggio and Powell 1983), as late adopters minimize losses rather than pursue technical 
gains (Kennedy and Fiss 2009). 
Institutional pressures to adopt sustainable practices arise from several stakeholders 
in the building sector. Adoption may be the result of market or public relations pressures 
(Braithwaite 1989, Henriques and Sardorsky 1996). Notably, late adopters with low-
quality products may have less substantial environmental improvements, while still earning 
the premium commanded by leader firms in their industry (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 
2010), or at least diminishing the willingness to pay for the label. In this sense, decoupling 
makes room for a form of greenwash (Lyon and Montgomery 2015), in which 
organizations mislead stakeholders by being green in name only. In the case of 
certification, where monitoring and enforcement ensure quality improvements, this implies 
a deviation from the original aims of the program, or a reduction in fit (Ansari, Fiss, and 
Zajac 2010). For LEED certification, this may manifest as a focus on private benefits, 
rather than the provision of public goods related to sustainability. 
Hypothesis 3. Over time, pathways converge on technologies conferring private gains. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are often closely related. For example, recent advances in 
numerous energy technologies have reduced the costs of energy production and energy 
efficiency, and implementing these technologies reduces long-run operating costs. 
However, not all technologies have characteristics of both: some have become more 
accessible and affordable but do not offer private gains, others offer private gains but may 
not have changed dramatically in cost (Table 1). Though both hypotheses may be upheld, 




Table 5.2. Contingent Interpretation of Hypotheses regarding the evolution of 
certification pathways over time. 
Pathway Convergence Related Hypotheses Interpretation 
Reduced-Cost 
Technologies H1, H2 
Learning drives the adaptation of certification 
pathways, despite expectations for symbolic 
management. The fit between the program and 
its adoption remains high. 






H1, H2, H3 
A combination of learning and symbolic 
management drives the adaptation of 
certification pathways. 





Symbolic management drives the adaptation of 
certification pathways, as the fit between the 
program and its adoption erodes in some 
fashion. This occurs despite expectations that 
learning should enhance performance. 
      
Neither Technology 
Types, or No 
Convergence 
(H1) Certification pathways are either highly tailored, or a not strategically selected.  
   
 
 
Importantly, if evidence suggests that Hypothesis 2 is upheld, but not Hypothesis 
3, we can understand that learning occurs and allows tailored approaches to certification 
that minimize costs while remaining consistent with the programmatic aims of LEED 
certification. On the other hand, if Hypothesis 3 is upheld, but not Hypothesis 2, evidence 
would suggest that a lock-in effect occurs, in which organizations adopt technologies 
without cost-minimization. These distinctions are surmised in Table 2. To differentiate 
between these two hypotheses requires tests that distinguish between the emergent 
characteristics, while controlling for related trends in the market for green buildings. 
Data on LEED pathways for 2,981 buildings under the New Construction version 
2.2 certification system were made available for this study. The data span ten years of 
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registrations, from 2004 to 2013, with final certifications running through 2014. This rating 
system was selected among other, similar rating systems for other types of buildings due 
to its large market uptake. Additionally, the properties are mostly owner-occupied, rather 
than leased. Half of owners are government agencies; for-profit and non-profit 
organizations each make up about seventeen percent of the data, and mixed ownership or 
public-private partnerships sponsor the remaining portion of buildings observed. Because 
certification includes parameters from site selection through construction and occupancy, 
more control may be exerted over the certification pathway of a newly constructed 
buildings, compared to renovations.  
This is the first version of LEED for which complete data are available, including 
owner information (name, sector), building use, certification information (date of 
registration and certification, certification tier and score, as well as complete qualitative 
data on each LEED credit obtained toward certification), and location (including 
coordinates, address, an ordinal measure of development density, and climate zone). 
Development density is measured from one (dense metropolitan) to seven (very rural). 
Location information is missing for a few hundred confidentially certified buildings. Later 
analysis is conducted with and without location controls, dropping observations with 
missing data as necessary.  
	
5.4 Convergence of Certification Pathways 
The diversity of certification pathways used under the LEED label creates a novel arena in 
which to test and apply theories describing the evolution of practices under opaque 
regulatory regimes, and the emergence of a dominant form of a particular practice. Based 
on hypotheses elaborated above, LEED certification pathways are expected to be more 
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homogenous over time, and to increasingly rely on pathways that minimize costs and/or 
confer private benefits. Hypothesis testing begins by constructing indexes of diversity. 
These test whether early adopters customize certification pathways more than latecomers. 
Then, trends over time are examined for each of the credits available, in order to gain a 
broad perspective on how technology choices evolve in pursuit of certification. Regression 
models are used to examine evidence in a multivariate setting, controlling for various other  
factors that may influence how organizations certify. Finally, several approaches are used 
to depict market sector differences in certification behaviors.  
The first hypothesis anticipates declining variance in the paths used towards LEED 
certification. Homogeneity in certification pathways may be measured using several 
indexes. Generalized variance, sometimes referred to as the Blau index (1970), of 
categorical variables is here used, and compared with results from similar indexes for 
robustness. Alternate measures include polarization and entropy. Generalized variance and 
entropy increase with diversity within groups, and decrease with homogeneity. Patterns for 
polarization follow the inverse pattern, increasing with homogeneity (Solanas et al. 2012). 
To apply this tool, each buildings’ certification pathway is identified as the total set of 
credits obtained, such that identical pathways can be readily noted as identical sets. The 
range of unique pathways in use becomes a set of categorical variables. Certification dates 
serve to group buildings into monthly cohorts, and diversity indexes are measured for each 






Figure 5.1. Certification Pathway Diversity Decreases over Time. On these graphs, 





As observed in Figure 1, pathway variance decreases across months. This effect is 
most pronounced in the entropy index, but each index generally affirms Hypothesis 1. Note 
that the bookend months of this graph contain only about two weeks of data, reducing the 
frequency of observations and lowering the potential diversity (Solanas et al. 2012). Even 
with these outliers, the trend still clearly suggests increased conformity. As measured, 
diversity appears quite high, even among late adopters. This is partially due to the high 
degree of freedom in certification options, which vary in both tier and type of credits.  
 
5.5 Identifying the Dominant Certification Pathway 
The choice of green technologies towards certification is, as introduced above, far from 
universal, and still evolving. As LEED certification becomes more popular, and as the 
program gains traction in new geographic regions and building market sectors, shifts in 
popular credits may occur for a variety of reasons. Data are observed in terms of the 
particular credits chosen over time. For each credit in the scoring system, correlations 
between the likelihood of adoption and adoption timing are calculated. Here, and 
throughout analysis, time is operationalized as the lag between a project’s certification date 
and the date of the first project certified in the data.  
Statistically significant correlations between time and credit adoption may provide 
insight about drivers of trends observed. Table 3 presents these correlations, using 
Bonferroni-adjusted p-values. LEED scores and certification tiers tend to increase 
throughout the period of observation. Increasingly, pathways rely on credits from the 
Energy and Atmosphere category. This is mostly based on increasing adoption of credits 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































S E M W
  
Figure 5.2. Visualization of LEED Certification Pathway Trends compared to 
prevailing motivations to certify. Potential motivations from Table 1 are list row-wise, 
and each LEED credit across the columns. (The dozens of LEED credits are grouped into 
credits pertaining to Site selection, Energy, Materials, Water, Innovation, and Quality of 
indoor environments).  White space indicates no changes anticipated for that combination 




Commissioning), and renewable energy production. Notably, onsite renewable power 
increases, but renewable power purchasing from the grid decreases. 
Water efficiency (Water Use Reduction) and also increases over time, along with 
credits for stormwater, heat island, construction waste, construction air quality, and indoor 
chemical management. By comparison, credits that appear less popular over time include 
bike storage, light pollution reduction, innovation, use of certified forestry products, low-
emitting materials, daylighting, and views of the outdoors. Other credits in the scoring 
system show no significant changes over time.  
Assessing practice adaptation trends in Table 3 to the sets of credits listed in Table 
1 provide initial insights into how decisions about certification pathways are made. To do 
this, Figure 2 visualizes relationships between expected practice adaptations and observed 
trends. Here, each credit in the LEED scoring system occupies a narrow column of space, 
with groups of credits corresponding to environmental impacts labeled across the top. 
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Rows provide room for differing expectations about credit adoption over time. A single 
logic for shifts in credit adoption occupies each row. White space within the resulting 
matrix indicates no expectations, while filled spaces mark red and green for refuted and 
upheld predictions. That is, the prevalence of red-shaded space in Figure 2 reveals that 
most of these expectations are not upheld, or are only partially upheld. 
Over time, LEED credits that confer public and biodiversity benefits do not 
significantly increase in popularity, and, more pointedly, the use of certified wood and light 
pollution mitigation technology decreases. Of the visible changes that could be used for 
conspicuous conservation, bike storage, and the large windows required for daylighting 
and outdoor views credits become much less common. The use of renewable energy 
becomes more common, but this credit is grouped in multiple categories. Technologies that 
may be ad hoc purchased and installed with little planning for LEED credit, including green 
power purchasing and indoor materials, show no increases or even show decreases in 
popularity. The same may be said of credits that confer benefits to occupants through 
improved indoor environmental health, or to construction workers through mitigated 
workplace air pollution.  
If learning occurs, it is not driving uptake of technologies offering these benefits. 
In fact, it is evident from Figure 2 that the only motivation offers a set of expectations that 
is logically consistent with observed trends is the expectation that private gains will be 
increasingly favored, regardless of decreasing technology costs. Though these credits 
occupy a small portion of the visualization, but account for more than a quarter of the points 
possible in the final LEED score. Still, observed trends in correlation tables may be 
partially or fully explained by the diffusion of LEED to new market sectors or new 
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geographic regions. Therefore, a multivariate approach is needed to test for increased 
pathway reliance on cost-minimizing technologies. 
 
5.6 Multivariate Analysis 
I model adoption of each of the credits associated with falling upfront costs or long-run 
private benefits from efficiency as a function of time and a binary indicator of private-
sector ownership. The models control for a set of variables related to overall score, building 
location, and building use, which might explain some of the variance in credit preferences. 
Some building attributes may be in vogue among urban peers, promoting adoption within 
rapidly developing cities. Moreover, some strategies may be more feasible or available in 
rural versus urban areas. Location is controlled with respect to development density, using 
an ordinal measure ranking areas from high to low density. In addition, regional variance 
exists in energy demand (which changes with heat and humidity), natural resources (such 
as incident solar), and water restrictions (which increases salience of conservation and 
runoff). Fixed effects for climate zones are included to control for this variation. Finally, 
buildings constructed for different uses may have very different design needs. A set of 
dummy variables are included, controlling for building uses ranging from schools, homes, 
factories, civic spaces, offices, stores, hospitals, and hotels. 
 Multivariate models in Table 4 confirm that trends are not purely the result of 
LEED diffusing to new regions or building market sectors. After controlling for location, 
building use, and market sector, private benefits remain the dominant strategy for 
certification over time. Notably, the use of these strategies does not appear to be 
differentiated by owner type, as for-profit owners are significantly less likely to pursue 
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Table 5.4. Multivariate Regression Models depicting credit adoption for technologies 
providing private benefits. Panel (a) depicts adoption models for individual credits using 
logistic regression, while (b) depicts ordinary least-squared regression models for 















Time 0.0071 *** 0.00508 *** 0.00747  0.0024  
  (0.00023)   (0.00017)  (0.00047)  (.00028)  
For-Profit Owner 0.23600   -0.254 * 0.0739  -0.353 * 
  (0.191)   (0.141)  (0.329)  (0.200)  
LEED Score 0.20500 *** 0.144 *** 0.176 *** 0.109 *** 
  (0.012)   (0.0097)  (0.0266)  (0.0146)  
Development Density  0.06320   -0.0513  0.0302  0.0312  
  (0.0469)   (0.0351)  (0.0979)  (0.0568)  
Climate Zone Fixed 
Effects yes yes yes yes 
Building Use Fixed 
Effects yes yes yes yes 
Constant -9.12000 *** -5.946 *** -2.482  -0.55  
Observations 2,361   2,367  2,361  2,361  
 
  Optimize Energy Performance All Efficiency Credits 
(b) OLS Coefficient (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time 0.0037 ** 0.0012  0.0076 *** 0.0054 *** 
  (.00016)  (.00018)  (.00019)  (.00021)  
For-Profit Owner 0.17300  0.22300  0.29500  0.53400 ** 
  (.19)  (.221)  (.22)  (.26)  
For-Profit Owner x 
Time -0.00083 ** -0.00018  -0.00139 *** -0.00092 * 
  (.00038)  (.00043)  (.00043)  (.00049)  
LEED Score 0.23800 *** 0.23800 *** 0.35000 *** 0.34600 *** 
  (.00506)  (.00608)  (.00638)  (.00768)  
Development Density      0.19700 ***     0.21400 *** 
      (.0332)      (.0387)  
Climate Zone Fixed 
Effects no yes no yes 
Building Use Fixed 
Effects no yes no yes 
Constant -3.92400 *** -4.15700 *** -5.50200 *** -5.51100 *** 
Observations 2981  2367  2981  2367  
R-squared 0.33500  0.36100  0.45000  0.46100  
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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efficiency credits, and no significant relationship exists between owner type and the other 
certification strategies depicted. Inclusion of owner type as an interaction term (Table 4b), 
or running these regressions as hazard models (Figure 3) does not clearly differentiate 




Figure 5.3. Cox Proportional Hazard Models show differences in certification 




An alternative specification draws on the Cox proportional hazard model, which 
uses maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the “risk” of adopting a LEED credit over 
time. While no assumptions are made about the baseline hazard, but does presume that the 
two market strata (public and private owners) face constant relative hazards (Cox 1972). 
That owners facing very different market conditions adopt indifferentiable certification 
pathways could challenge this assumption, or simply suggests that architects influence 
pathway determination, specializing in building types that cut across ownership sectors. If 
the latter, conformity may be accelerated. Of note in Figure 3 is the sharp upward bend in 
the likelihood of adopting most LEED practices in the Autumn of 2013. In this year, an 
updated version 4 of the LEED certification program was introduced, suggesting that those 
still using version 2.2 are the tail end of adopters. 
 
5.7 Improved Technological Fit? 
The data presented above suggest an increased emphasis on certification pathways that 
provide private benefits to the building owner through energy and water efficiency. 
Standardization of certification pathways increases uniformity of quality across those 
adopting, in an apparent reduction of signal noise. This challenges economic perspectives 
anticipating increasingly noisy signals from late adopters (Stiglitz 2000). Further, some 
organizations theory anticipates reduced performance among late adopters, who adopt in 
response to social pressures rather than performance opportunities (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983, Ingram and Silverman 2002, Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac 2010, Kennedy and Fiss 2009).  
 In some sense, efficiency may increase due to learning. During the study period, 
these technologies became more affordable and availability, individuals and organizations 
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gained experience and understanding using them, and building codes advanced. These all 
suggest an improved technical fit between practice and its adaptation (Ansari, Fiss, and 
Zajac 2010). Yet from Figure 2 we observe that this is an incomplete picture of the overall 
trends in certification pathways. Numerous green building technologies diffused rapidly 
during this period, becoming widely available and more cost-effective, yet not all become 
more popular. Some such technologies, such as construction waste management, were not 
available to early adopters, who innovated green building techniques and practices to gain 
certification, stimulating market supply of those practices for future adopters (Simcoe and 
Toffel 2014).  
 Those technologies which should have diffused due to learning, but which did not 
become more prevalent in LEED certification pathways vary systematically from those 
that did become part of the dominant pathway. Those which become more popular are all 
directly associated with a clearly measurable private benefit from efficiency. Those which 
do not become more popular are either purely public goods, or offer only indirect or 
intangible benefits to the building owner. Though LEED scores increase over time, and 
though the label appears to induce improvements (Matisoff, Noonan, and Mazzolini 2014) 
to energy efficiency (Asensio and Delmas 2017), the data show that the label may not 
effectively incentivize public good provision. 
The LEED label aims to improve environmental outcomes by providing a complex 
mechanism that distinguishes quality and bundles market rents to public good provision. 
Although improvements in some green building practices are observed, this growth does 
not occur in all dimensions. A more extensive adaptation of LEED certification would 
emphasize public benefits more than what is observed in the data. From a policy and public 
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economics perspective, it may be worth investigating how market and information 
programs like LEED can be improved to provide these types of benefits.  
 
5.8 Verifying Intangibles… and Tangibles 
From Figure 2, most sets of expectations demonstrate mixed results. If LEED certification 
is pursued to address concerns for biodiversity, occupant health, or labor conditions, it does 
not appear that the emergent or dominant form of the certification pathway meets these 
goals. This gap has been noted extensively by critics, who might assert that “LEED is just 
a regular building with a bike rack” to suggest the label does not achieve some more 
fundamental goal, or that certification is merely symbolic greenwashing. Yet notably, the 
adoption of bike racks toward LEED certification becomes less popular over time.  
 In fact, the visible demonstrations of green quality are relatively more popular 
among early adopters compared to latecomers. This is true of each visible LEED credit, 
with two exceptions, both related to reducing energy use. That early adopters feel the need 
to tangibly demonstrate building qualities above and beyond certification is puzzling. 
Typically, certification is used to verify improvements that cannot be observed by the 
consumer, labels inform consumers about qualities they will experience once using the 
good, and directly observable qualities require neither of these strategies. Green roofs, solar 
panels, and large windows for daylighting are all quite conspicuous. Why would early 
adopters choose to verify tangible improvements?  
A plausible explanation arises from demand-side learning: early adopters certify 
despite low recognition and understanding of the label. When this is the case, the label 
cannot alone credibly verify environmental quality, and early adopters must ensure 
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understanding by visibly distinguishing the product. As the practice diffuses and 
recognition grows, adopters are less dependent on visibility and may instead rely on the 
elite status established by early adopters and conferred by the certification (Potoski and 
Prakash 2009).  
 
5.9 Learning, or Locking-In? 
Whereas early adopters certify through practices that don’t call for verification, late 
adopters certify through practices that oughtn’t require incentives from market premiums. 
Energy efficiency has numerous benefits independent of certification (Allcott and 
Greenstone 2012). Moreover, early adopters provided innovations and stimulated supply-
side spillovers that made some credits more plausible, more accessible, and more 
affordable, which did not become integrated with the dominant certification pathway. 
Though some learning appears at play, this learning seems to be concentrated among early 
innovators, without strong implications for later replicators.  
 The emergence of dominant LEED certification pathways is characteristic of a 
lock-in effect in which practices are replicated without the optimization assumptions of 
technology choice. From the data, we observe greater adoption of LEED certification, but 
not more production of public benefits. Yet the flexible certification program design was 
intended to provide room for customization and innovation, and to avoid such lock-in.  
This challenges the preference for flexible, voluntary, and market-based 
approaches as policy tools for environmental management that avoid the Pareto 
inefficiencies that arise from technology lock-in (Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins 1998, 
Stavins 1998). While increased efficiency is generally desirable, it is not clear that this 
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outcome was intended when the program began. Because sustainability is a multifaceted 
goal, it is not clear whether LEED buildings are getting greener, or just “LEEDier.”  
The increased adoption without substantive contribution to public goods is 
consistent with decoupling literature that anticipates more symbolic management (Ingram 
and Silverman 2002, Powell and DiMaggio 1991) as adopters respond to social pressures 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Over time, real estate investment trusts may have pressured 
builders toward adoption, and, numerous policies have popped up at the local level to 
coerce builders toward more sustainable practices. Given these pressures, the extent to 
which certification is voluntary is not clear, and may impact the types of impacts realized 
through the program. 
 
5.10 Conclusion 
The analysis above identifies the emergence of dominant practices toward LEED 
certification. An understanding of how certification is obtained can help us understand how 
well the program works in reaching its goals. In this case, the flexibility with which LEED 
addresses multifaceted goals presents challenges to measuring progress. By opening the 
“black box” of adoption, we can observe that private benefits from efficiency measures are 
increasingly adopted, though this growth appears to come at the expense of public benefits, 
despite bundling public goods to private market returns (Kotchen 2006, 2013) from 
certification and signaling (Matisoff, Noonan, and Mazzolini 2014). The complexity of 
LEED’s approach leaves open this possibility, though the approach appears adept at 
mitigating other market failures. How can public good provision be stimulated, when it is 
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entangled with other market failures? Some of the world’s greatest challenges involve such 
complex aims (Durant 2004). Future policy innovations provide answers this question. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
In the preceding chapters, I present evidence regarding the adaptation of green building 
certification pathways to different market sectors over time. Data suggest that firms are 
more willing to invest in energy efficiency in order to reach higher signaling tiers, and learn 
to implement efficiency practices more extensively over time, especially in the private 
sector. Despite some notions that LEED as a noisy signal should wane in effectiveness, the 
number of buildings choosing to certify within the program grows each year. Moreover, it 
appears that certification increases in extensiveness and fidelity each year. This suggests 
that a Race to the Top may be occurring, at least with regard to some components of the 
green building movement. The results suggest an evolution of practices that increasingly 
depend on private benefits, consistent with the notion of sustainability as supporting the 
triple bottom-line.  
Methodologically, this dissertation opens the black box of practice adoption to 
advance our ability to measure marketing as a distinct from environmental performance. 
Relaxing the assumption that fidelity is orthogonal to extensiveness, I present an alternative 
framework for practice adaptation, which proves useful in understanding noisy green 
signals. In doing so, I advance signaling theory to accommodate the idea that signals may 
be tuned to specific stakeholder interests. This nuanced view of signaling theory 
synthesizes the existing economic perspective with past work on corporate responsibility 
and organizations. Though the literatures were previously disjointed, this dissertation 
presents a unified framework of green signals. 
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 In each chapter, I investigate green signaling trends in LEED certification, drawing 
on two central measures of practice adaptation: extensiveness and fidelity. Though I 
generally measure these as public good provision and performance motivation, I relax the 
relationship between the measure and the concept in the final chapter. This allows us to 
question the extent to which certification meets the original aim of the green building 
movement. As discussed, the answer to this question is highly normative, and in some ways 
a matter of philosophy rather than empirics. However, this question points to a key next 
step in the thread of presented empirical research.  
Noting the ambiguity with which the certification pathways in available data appear 
to meet the goals of the green building movement (Chapter 5), it stands to reason that the 
goals of green building policies may or may not be met. In response to this question, I’ve 
constructed a database of green building policies across the United States. These vary 
immensely in terms of their stringency, scope, and focus (Matisoff, Noonan, and Flowers 
2016), but each is explicit about its goal(s). Green building certification pathways can be 
examined before and after each policy at a local level, comparing the original aim to the 
ultimate result. From a policy evaluation perspective, this presents an opportunity for a 
large-N study of local sustainability initiatives. From a management perspective, this 
stands to confer deeper understanding of means-ends decoupling under circumstances of 
adoption that are voluntary, coerced, and incentivized. A comparison of trends in 
certification pathways to policy drivers of certification may reveal how coercion influences 
fidelity in practice adaptation, a direct test of past theoretical propositions (Ansari, Fiss, 
and Zajac 2010).  
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 Adaptation fidelity is one central dimension of the research presented and 
anticipated thus far; adaptation extensiveness is another. A key challenge to the assessment 
of voluntary program adoption is the role that adopters play in diffusing practices to their 
neighbors (Matisoff 2015). In the case of green building certifications, peer effects seem 
to have played a major role in diffusing practices to non-adopters (Simcoe and Toffel 
2014). While in some ways it appears adoption becomes more extensive over time (Chapter 
4), a variety of organizational perspectives suggest diminished extensiveness over time 
(Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac 2010). A critical component of our understanding in this matter is 
the role that networks play in diffusing best practices. This is suggested by some literature 
(Owen-Smith and Powell 2004, Prakash and Potoski 2006, Saikawa 2013), and in the 
dissertation (Chapter 4), but is not treated in a general sense. By leveraging building 
certification trends across metro-area markets, it is possible to observe how individual 
building owners carry practices from one network to another, stimulating practice adoption. 
Further, the clustering of individual LEED credits within these markets may be useful in 
observing the adaptation of practices over time. This approach builds on insights developed 
in Chapter 4, which suggests that voluntary programs may be a catalyst for market 
transformation.  
 The signaling and learning perspective on Racing suggests a potential for 
information programs to be increasingly exploited into a Race to the Bottom (Chapter 4). 
In the weak form, this occurs when organizations may overstate their performance, 
capitalizing on market benefits of green signals without substantive environmental 
performance improvement. The strong form, more alarmingly, suggests that the standards 
themselves may be manipulated to diminish both fidelity and extensiveness of practice 
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adaptation over time. This is premised on the notion of regulatory gaming of voluntary 
standards (Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett 2000), a case of “regulatory capture” in which non-
state governance fails to induce legitimacy (Bernstein and Cashore 2007). The extent to 
which a voluntary program may be captured by non-state governance structures is critical 
to the successful diffusion of the voluntary program (Darnall, Potoski, and Prakash 2009), 
but has not been addressed in a longitudinal setting capable of revealing shifts in the 
legitimacy of a standard-setting body. The decision-making processes within non-state 
governing bodies draws important questions about the legitimacy of the standards they 
produce; more generally, it is not clear that the institutions they represent are 
democratically supported, pointing to further areas of normative investigation. 
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